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The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and 
disclosure of corporate information by listed companies in developing economies. A comparative 
study was carried out covering listed companies in South Africa, East Africa and Nigeria. The 
study is based on the agency theory which asserts that enhanced disclosure is one of the 
fundamental goals of a company’s reporting system aimed at reducing agency costs and 
information asymmetries between shareholders and managers, and hence a tenet of any effective 
governance system. Although corporate disclosure provides a channel through which 
shareholders obtain valuable information to make investment decisions, prior studies reported 
mixed empirical evidence on the role of corporate governance in enhancing corporate disclosure. 
Empirical evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa and developing economies in general remains 
scanty. Despite the fact that corporate governance systems have been widely used in 
strengthening the quality of financial reporting and disclosure, several corporate scandals and 
failures have continued to occur around the globe and the efficacy of corporate governance on 
disclosure activities in preventing managers from misappropriating corporate resources remains 
an empirical question. 
 A comprehensive literature review revealed six corporate governance attributes (Chief 
Executive Officer [CEO] non-duality, board size, board composition, composition of audit 
committees, block and director share ownership) and three control variables (Firm size, leverage, 
and profitability) that may have a significant influence on corporate disclosure. Corporate 
disclosure was categorized into disclosure of financial and non-financial information. Data was 
collected from annual reports of non-financial listed companies on selected securities exchanges 
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in Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2010 to 2013. A comparative panel data analysis was then 
carried out using STATA MP Version 13, to obtain random-effects regression models which 
were used to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate disclosure.  
Overall, the findings revealed that CEO non-duality, board size and board composition have a 
positive significant effect on corporate disclosure, while the effect of block and director share 
ownership is negative. The study concluded that for effective disclosure of information in 
developing economies, companies should minimize block and director share ownership; separate 
the roles of chief executive officers and chairpersons of board of directors; increase board size; 
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1.1  BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The concept of corporate governance has become a universal business quality issue and is 
believed to play a vital role in the management of organizations in both developed and 
developing economies (Mwanzia and Wong, 2011:16). The term, which scarcely existed before 
the 1990s, is now universally discussed whenever business and financial issues arise. It is a fast-
evolving concept and its development has been driven by the need to restore investor confidence 
in the operation of capital markets (Nadeem, Zongjun and Shoaib, 2013:38). 
 
Corporate governance is a system by which companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury 
Report, 1992:14). It is associated with the protection of shareholders’ interests through the 
establishment of good governance systems (Olof, Mattias and Johan, 2007:295). In a broader 
perspective, the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004:13) 
principles of corporate governance define it as a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, shareholders and other stakeholders. Effective corporate governance 
reduces control rights which shareholders and other fund providers confer on managers, thus 
increasing the probability of managers investing in positive net present value investment projects 




The common tenet in all governance systems is the facilitation of the control of management and 
achievement of company value (Poh and Grantley, 2013:6). 
Globally, corporations have taken steps to strengthen their governance practices to enhance 
accountability, transparency in financial reporting and disclosure of corporate information. 
Transparent financial reporting is critical in reducing information asymmetry and facilitates the 
monitoring of management’s actions, making it difficult for management to act opportunistically 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond, 2006:212). Therefore, corporate governance protects 
shareholders from expropriation by managers and increases investor confidence.   
The demand for corporate disclosure increases day by day due to agency conflicts and 
asymmetric information between corporate management and shareholders. According to the 
agency theory, these conflicts are caused by the separation of ownership and control which lead 
to the misalignment of managers and shareholders’ interests (Healy and Palepu, 2001:406).  
  Higher disclosure, in addition to reducing information asymmetry, could help minimize the 
conflict of interests between shareholders and management (Htay, Majdi, Akhyar and Meera, 
2012:5) and reduce agency costs (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:46). 
 On the other hand, poor disclosure of corporate information can mislead shareholders into 
making sub-optimal investment decisions, which ultimately affect company value and 
shareholders’ wealth.   Poor disclosure of corporate information may also bring about the 
transfer of wealth from owners to managers, making current and potential investors discount 




Several high-profile corporate failures in both developed and developing economies, have 
increased global awareness of the importance of corporate governance (Nurwati and Wan, 
2009:7; Chen and Jaggi, 2001:291).   
 
Globally, the collapse of major corporate entities such as Adelphia, Enron and WorldCom, in the 
United States of America (USA), South East Asia, Europe and Nigeria has shaken investors’ 
faith and confidence in the capital markets and the efficacy of existing corporate governance 
practices in the promotion of transparency, accountability and financial disclosure quality. This 
has rejuvenated the need for good corporate governance and disclosure of all relevant 
information in corporate entities. 
 
In developing economies, the corporate governance debate has resulted in the development of 
various codes and best practices of corporate governance. For instance, according to Wanyama, 
Burton and Helliar (2009:162), in East Africa, the corporate governance regime in Uganda, 
evolved through the formulation of relevant laws which resulted in the establishment of various 
regulatory and supervisory agencies such as the Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda 
(ICGU), Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), Uganda Capital Markets Authority (CMA) and the 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU). In 2000, the Kenyan Capital 
Market Authority issued draft corporate governance guidelines outlining significant changes to 
corporate governance practices for listed companies which included, establishment of audit 
committees, having non-executive directors on corporate boards and separation of roles of the 
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CEO and the chair board of directors (Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006:109). In Nigeria, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission inaugurated and mandated a corporate governance 
committee to develop corporate governance guidelines for public companies (Adenike, 
2013:110). This led to the introduction of the code of best practices in 2003, which resulted in 
gradual and consistent improvements in corporate governance (Isimkah, 2012:19). South Africa 
also published its corporate governance code of best practice in King reports I, II, and III. This is 
why there is a need to evaluate the effectiveness of these corporate governance practices and 
their influence on corporate disclosure in the selected countries. 
 
1.2  STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Globally, the demand for corporate disclosure is increasing rapidly due to agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders that have led to several corporate 
failures (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:46). Although corporate governance systems have been widely 
used in strengthening the quality of financial reporting and corporate disclosure, several 
corporate scandals and failures have continued to occur around the globe (Bhasin and Shaikh, 
2013:80). Major cases include Enron, Parmalat, Satyam, Qwest Communications International, 
Tyco, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Xerox, and WorldCom (Elisabetta, Hugh and Lorenzo, 
2012:142). While in theory, increased disclosure reduces agency costs, the efficacy of corporate 
governance on disclosure activities in constraining self-interested managers from misusing 




Therefore, there is a need to strengthen corporate governance systems so as to enhance 
disclosure of information for listed companies in developing countries. Although a lot of 
research has been carried out on the association between corporate governance systems and 
corporate disclosure, most of these studies have focused on developed economies (Barako et al., 
2006:108). Similar studies in developing countries are limited and only target individual 
countries (Tsamenyi, Ennuinful and Onumah, 2007:320). While corporate governance literature 
suggests a link between agency conflicts and sub-optimal disclosure, there is limited empirical 
evidence to show that corporate governance mechanisms designed to control agency conflicts 
have a positive effect on corporate disclosure (Seamer, 2014:220).  
1.3  OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY  AND RESEARCH  QUESTIONS 
The primary objective of the study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and disclosure of corporate information by listed companies in developing economies. The 
specific objectives include: 
i. To establish corporate governance attributes applicable for disclosure of corporate 
information by listed companies in developing economies. 
ii. To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of 
financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
iii. To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of 
non-financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
The research questions that guided the study to achieve research objectives include: 
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i. What are the corporate governance attributes applicable for disclosure of corporate 
information by listed companies in developing economies? 
ii. What is the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of 
financial information by listed companies in developing economies? 
iii. What is the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of non-
financial information by listed companies in developing economies? 
1.4  MOTIVATION OF THE STUDY 
The motivation of this study is threefold. First, although a number of studies on the relationship 
between corporate governance and corporate disclosure have been carried out in developed 
economies, limited research has been done in developing countries (Nurwati and Wan, 2009:6).  
Developing countries are those states in the mid-stream of development which are mostly found 
in Asia, Latin America and Africa. They suffer from lack of professional and skilled personnel, 
and face challenges in attracting professionals with accounting and finance knowledge (Waweru, 
Kamau and Uliana, 2011:339). They are also faced with difficulties such as underdeveloped and 
illiquid stock markets, weak regulatory and legal controls and economic uncertainties, which call 
for effective corporate governance mechanisms that enhance corporate disclosure (Tsamenyi et 
al., 2007:319). Herath and Freeman (2012:90) assert that the numerous unique problems faced by 
developing countries, such as weak governance and regulatory controls, make their corporate 




Secondly, companies operating in developing economies need substantial foreign direct 
investments to support the locally generated capital required to spur economic growth and 
development. However, for this to happen, foreign investors from developed economies with 
higher disclosure and transparent systems would demand comparable levels of transparency and 
disclosure from companies in developing economies (Adelopo, 2011: 339).  A survey by the 
World Bank of 60 developing nations identified lack of transparency, non-disclosure of 
corporate information and corruption as the greatest impediments to economic development in 
developing countries (Adenike, 2013:110). Therefore, in order to enhance transparency and 
disclosure of information in developing economies, there should be good corporate governance 
systems in place. 
 
Thirdly, corporate scandals such as those involving Enron and WorldCom have exposed  
corporate governance failures that affected the economies of developed nations and have drawn 
attention to weak corporate governance in developing economies (Okpara, 2011: 184). Similarly, 
a number of financial crises and scandals in Nigeria, South Africa, East Africa and globally, have 
reignited the debate that has continued to focus on the need for strengthening corporate 
governance systems with a view to enhancing corporate disclosure. In East Africa, Uganda has 
had several corporate failures such as the Co-operative Bank, Greenland Bank, and Trans-
African Bank.  A commission of inquiry that was set up by the Government to review the 
collapse of these banks reported that the possible causes could have been: poor governance 
systems, lack of transparency and information disclosure, and fraud (Wanyama et al., 2013:20). 
In Nigeria, a comprehensive study carried out by the World Bank Group observed that Nigerian 




 In response to various corporate governance scandals, governments have introduced a number of 
regulatory changes, one of which is increased corporate disclosure (Okpara, 2011:187). 
However, although from the agency theory perspective, corporate governance mechanisms are 
considered an important factor in explaining decisions of voluntary corporate disclosure, very 
limited research has been carried out to examine the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate disclosure (Samaha, Dahawy, Hussaney and Stapleton, 2012:169). 
Furthermore, despite the evidence that agency conflicts lead to inadequate disclosure of 
corporate information, relatively few studies have investigated whether corporate governance 
mechanisms designed to control agency conflict are effective in enhancing optimal information 
disclosure (Seamer, 2014:112). This, therefore, prompts the need to examine the effectiveness of 
good governance practices in enhancing disclosure of corporate information in developing 
economies. 
1.5   SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study covered a comparative analysis of the relationship between corporate governance 
attributes and corporate disclosure in developing economies. Specifically, the study covered 
listed companies on selected major stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The choice of listed 
companies was based on the fact that their operations are regulated by Capital Market 
Authorities and Security Exchange Commissions and their annual and corporate governance 
reports can be easily obtained. The selected securities exchanges in this study were: Nigeria 
Stock Exchange in West Africa; Nairobi Securities Exchange and Uganda Securities Exchange 




 Nigeria Stock Exchange was selected because it is the major stock market in West Africa 
although its operations were heavily affected by the 2007-2008 global financial crises, leading to 
to increased capital flights from the Nigerian capital market by foreign investors (Nwude, 
2012:109). The global crises tested the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in Nigeria 
Stock Exchange on disclosure of relevant information to corporate stakeholders. 
East Africa was selected because since the inception of capital market operations and 
incorporation of securities exchanges in the region — that is, the Nairobi Securities Exchange in 
1954 and Uganda Securities Exchange in 1997 — few empirical studies on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and corporate disclosure have been carried out. Even then, the few studies 
carried out, like those of Barako et al. (2006:120) and Barako (2007:125), produced mixed 
results. For instance, whereas the findings of Barako et al. (2006:120) show that CEO non-
duality has no significant influence on corporate disclosure, Barako (2007:125) revealed that 
CEO non-duality has a positive significant influence on disclosure of governance and Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) information. Furthermore, Barako et al. (2006:120) established that 
board composition has a negative influence on corporate disclosure while empirical results of 
Barako (2007:125) show that board composition has a negative significant influence on 
disclosure of financial information while its impact on disclosure of governance and CSR 




In addition, the Nairobi Securities Exchange is one of the oldest stock markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and all East African Community member states (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding to set up a Securities Regulatory Authority in an effort to 
promote integration amongst East African Securities Exchanges. Uganda Securities Exchange 
has harmonized its listing rules with Nairobi Securities Exchange (Adjasi and Yartey, 2007:25). 
Therefore, the capital market and securities exchange operations in the region require good 
practices of corporate governance, transparency, and corporate disclosure which is the focus of 
this study. 
 
The choice of South Africa was motivated by the fact that it is among the first developing 
economies to publish its corporate governance guidelines and code of best practices (King I 
Report  in 1994, King II Report I in 2002, and King III Report in 2010) and it is the largest 
African securities exchange with considerable influence on the African continent. Wanyama et 
al. (2009:162) state that South Africa became one of the leaders in the corporate governance 
field, not only on the African continent, but also on the globe by setting up King Committee in 
1992 with the aim of improving corporate governance systems. However, despite the uniqueness 
of the development of corporate governance practices in South Africa compared to other 
developing countries, there are a limited number of corporate disclosure studies whose samples 




Although this empirical study considers corporate governance in its entirety and provides an 
extensive review of corporate governance, its scope was limited to a few corporate governance 
attributes applicable to the disclosure of corporate information in developing economies. The 
attributes include: CEO non-duality, board composition, and board size, composition of audit 
committees, block ownership of shares and director share ownership.  These attributes were 
identified through extensive literature reviews and their influence on disclosure of corporate 
information is discussed with controls for firm size, profitability and leverage. In line with 
previous studies (Wen, Philomena and Barry, 2013:262; Poh and Grantley, 2013:83; and Rouf, 
2011:7844), corporate disclosure involves the disclosure of financial information and non-
financial information which focuses on governance and CSR. 
1.6  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Literature on corporate governance and corporate disclosure in developing economies in general 
and particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa is limited. This study fills the current research gaps in 
corporate governance literature, with particular emphasis on corporate disclosure by listed 
companies in developing countries. The study also evaluates the effectiveness of corporate 
governance systems in enhancing disclosure of information and transparency by listed 
companies in developing economies. Corporate disclosure is vital for attracting investments and 
boosting economic growth and development. The research makes a contribution by suggesting 
the kind of corporate governance system required to increase disclosure of corporate information 





This study makes a comparative analysis of listed companies in Nigeria, East Africa and South 
Africa. There are few studies with such a focus since most research on corporate governance and 
disclosure has been concentrated on an individual country. The study, therefore, contributes to 
the current limited literature on how corporate governance research can be carried out on a 
comparative basis in both developed and developing economies. 
1.7  ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The study continues as follows: 
Chapter two describes the theoretical framework of corporate governance (the agency, 
stewardship and stakeholder theories). It also outlines the development of corporate governance 
systems in the area under study (Nigeria, East Africa and South Africa). The chapter describes 
corporate disclosure and discusses existing literature and theoretical gaps between the agency 
theory, corporate governance and corporate disclosure. 
Chapter three covers the research design and approach used to carry out the study. It outlines the 
hypotheses formulated after extensive literature review and the econometric model describing 
the variables under study. The chapter also describes the study period and the sampling 
procedure. It further describes data collection methods and measurement of study variables. The 
chapter ends by describing models and the statistical tool used in data analysis. 
Chapter four presents descriptive statistics evaluating the level of application of corporate 
governance attributes for listed companies in the area under study (South Africa, East Africa and 
Nigeria), in comparison with existing studies in both developed and developing economies. It 
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also presents tests of normality and discusses results of Spearman’s correlation analysis. It ends 
with the use of correlation analysis to detect multicollinearity. 
Chapter five covers a comparative analysis and interpretation of findings on the effect of 
corporate governance attributes on disclosure of financial information for listed firms in South 
Africa, East Africa and Nigeria. 
Chapter six covers a comparative analysis and interpretation of findings on the effect of 
corporate governance attributes on disclosure of non-financial information for listed firms in 
South Africa, East Africa and Nigeria. 
Chapter seven presents a discussion and summary of significant findings in relation to the study 
hypotheses. The chapter discusses empirical results in relation to theory and existing empirical 
research. The chapter further presents contributions of the study to the body of knowledge, to the 
society and to policy makers, gives conclusions and proposes several recommendations. The 












2.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses literature that relates corporate governance to corporate 
disclosure. It commences with the evaluation of corporate governance theories and how they 
form a basis for corporations to strengthen corporate governance systems that finally impact on 
the disclosure of corporate information. These include the agency, stakeholder, and stewardship 
theories. The chapter further discusses developments and the regulatory framework of corporate 
governance systems in the area under study (Nigeria, East Africa and South Africa) with a view 
to establishing how the current governance systems impact on the disclosure of corporate 
information. 
 
 The chapter progresses by reviewing the existing empirical studies and findings of corporate 
governance attributes and control variables that influence disclosure of corporate information. 
This review helped identify research gaps in the existing empirical findings, hence laying a basis 
to justify the need for further research. The governance attributes considered in this literature 
review include  CEO non-duality, board composition and board size, composition of audit 
committees, block ownership of shares, and director share ownership, while the control variables 




2.2  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate governance is a system under which corporations are directed and controlled. It 
encompasses the authority, stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the 
process of managing corporate entities (Mwanzia and Wong, 2011:14). It is a corporate structure 
in which agents (managers) have a lot of powers delegated to them so that they can carry out 
entrepreneurial activities on behalf of principals — the shareholders (Sven, Elin, Timurs, Penillar 
and Torbjorn, 2013:80). Corporate governance is defined as a system in which all corporate 
stakeholders attempt to ensure that the firm’s activities are controlled in such a way that 
managers will adopt mechanisms that protect stakeholder interests. It is a system of laws, 
regulations, institutions, markets, contracts, and corporate policies and procedures that direct and 
influence the actions of top-level decision makers in an organization (Brickley & Zimmerman, 
2010:2).  
 
If effective governance systems are not put in place to monitor the activities of corporate 
managers, then the interests of managers would override those of investors and therefore the 
shareholders’ wealth maximization objective would not be realized. Corporate governance is a 
fast-evolving concept and its development has been driven by the need to restore investor 
confidence in the operations of capital markets through the promotion of transparency and 
corporate information disclosure (Nadeem, Zongjun and Shoaib, 2013:39). The issue of 
corporate governance has become vital in the corporate world since it influences the ability of 
companies to raise funds from capital markets, narrows the gap between the agents and 
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principals, and helps in the building of a strong financial system and economy that is less 
susceptible to economic crises (Htay, Syed and Ibrahim, 2013:120). 
 
Traditionally, research into corporate governance has adopted the agency theory approach 
focusing exclusively on resolving agency conflicts between corporate management and 
shareholders (Niamh and Jill, 2008:888). Agency and stewardship are the main theories 
underlying the literature and research on corporate governance (Mwanzia and Wong, 2011:16). 
The consideration of corporate governance has, however, started to broaden in its coverage and 
there has been a change in emphasis away from the traditional shareholder-centered approach to 
a more stakeholder-oriented approach (Niamh and Jill, 2008:892). Therefore, the theoretical 
framework of corporate governance in this study focuses on the agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder theories. 
 
2.2.1  Agency theory 
Most researches on corporate governance are based on the agency theory which focuses on 
resolving conflicting interests between corporate managers and shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976:309). Agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one party (the 
principal) engages another party (the agent) to perform some activities on behalf of the principal. 
The directors and managers as agents are directly responsible for the smooth operations of the 
company, which must be in line with the interests of shareholders. They are, therefore, expected 
to work efficiently to ensure that the wealth of shareholders is maximized by investing in highly 
profitable ventures. However, due to the separation of ownership and control, agency problems 
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such as moral hazards and adverse selection could emerge, and corporate directors might 
maximize their own interests at the expense of shareholders (Htay, Syed and Ibrahim, 2013:121). 
Adverse selection and moral hazards occur when a principal cannot clearly ascertain whether an 
agent is using his abilities with maximum effort to perform the activities that he is paid to do 
(Mwanzia and Wong, 2011:16). This creates agency conflicts in the management of corporate 
resources where managers end up benefiting from company investment returns more than the 
shareholders. The agency conflicts, coupled with information asymmetry, provide potential for 
financial reporting and disclosure concerns to arise (Akileng, 2014:2). 
 
Through the comprehensive theory of the firm developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
agency arrangements were established, under which principals (shareholders) can be assured that 
agents will make optimal decisions only if appropriate incentives are given and agents are 
monitored (Bonazzi and Sardar, 2007:8). Monitoring of agents includes systematic reviews of 
management decisions, financial audits and the ensuring of maximum transparency and 
corporate information disclosure, which calls for good corporate governance mechanisms. 
According to Htay et al. (2013:121), agency theory and many corporate guidelines suggest that 
corporations should have good governance systems so as to enhance transparency and disclosure 
of corporate information. Corporate stakeholders are concerned with the agency theory because 
of the existence of agency costs which are an inevitable result of separation of corporate 
ownership and control (Mueller, 2007:629). 
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2.2.2  Stewardship theory 
According to Abeysekera (2010:506), corporate disclosure literature related to corporate 
governance has been theorized using the agency and stewardship perspectives. The stewardship 
theory was advanced to deal with motivational uncertainties highlighted by the agency theory. Its 
departure from the agency theory holds the view that corporate managers are less individualistic, 
opportunistic and self-serving. The theory acknowledges that managers and executive employees 
of the company are trustworthy and aim to achieve their own goals by serving the interests of the 
organization (Robins, 2008:332). It postulates that corporate managers are motivated by the need 
to gain intrinsic satisfaction through the accomplishment of challenging tasks to the best of their 
abilities (Okpara, 2011:185). Their motivation transcends mere monetary needs; it focuses on 
recognition through the achievement of organizational objectives. 
 
The proponents of the stewardship theory argue that stewards ensure that corporate governance 
structures are adhered to and will seek to maximize organizational utility through profitable use 
of organizational resources (Cam, Linda, Ranjan and Patricia, 2008:154). The stewardship 
approach to corporate governance therefore proposes that managers should have interests similar 
to those of the corporations they lead and that their careers and reputations are linked with the 
attainment of organizational goals (Suzanne and Vijaya, 2008:98). It therefore supports the 
empowering of corporate structures and governance mechanisms to allow managers and 





2.2.3  Stakeholder theory 
This theory extends the scope of corporate governance beyond the relationship between 
management and shareholders to include other interested parties in the corporation’s activities 
(Wanyama et al., 2013:21). It is premised on the notion of the firm as a legal and artificial person 
that carries out its activities in a community and it is based on the view that there is a need to 
disclose corporate information and satisfy various needs of different interested parties. The 
stakeholder theory recognizes the fact that most corporations have a large and integrated set of 
stakeholders to which they have an obligation and responsibility and therefore they should have 
governance systems tailored towards meeting their specific and diverse requirements (Sweeney 
and Coughlan, 2008:115).The implication of the theory is that corporate disclosure should not 
only aim at resolving conflicts between corporate management and shareholders but also focus 
on serving the interests of all stakeholders. 
 
The emergence of stakeholder theory in corporate governance was prompted by the growing 
recognition of the need to take into account the wider interests of the society (Kang et al., 
2007:406). It is therefore believed that with the increasing importance of broadening the domain 
of corporate governance requirements beyond major shareholders to other stakeholders such as 
small shareholders, suppliers, and employees, board independence will ensure that their interests 
are directly represented in corporate decision-making. The theory posits that corporate disclosure 
reduces information asymmetries between a company and its stakeholders (Brammer and 
Pavelin, 2008:121). This helps the company to disseminate value relevant information and also 
provide opportunities to different stakeholders such as stock analysts, capital markets, and 
individual and institutional investors regarding the future financial prospects of the firm. 
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Although all the theories evaluated (agency, stewardship and stakeholder) help to describe the 
importance of corporate governance to corporate disclosure, most studies that evaluate the 
efficacy of corporate governance systems use the agency theory. This is because the basis of the 
agency theory is to explain how the agency conflicts that arise because of different interests of 
shareholders and managers of a company can be mitigated. The concept of effective governance 
evolved from the relationship between the agency theory participants in an organization —  that 
is, the shareholders (principals) and management (agents) — and it is deemed to be achieved 
when governance mechanisms are implemented to ensure that their interests are fully aligned 
(Christopher, 2010:684). Corporate disclosure is one of the important tools used to mitigate 
asymmetric information and agency problems (Cheung, Jiang and Tan, 2010:261). This study, 
therefore, uses the agency theory in evaluating the efficacy of corporate governance on corporate 
disclosure in developing economies. 
2.3  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS IN NIGERIA, EAST AFRICA AND 
SOUTH AFRICA. 
Corporate governance is a relatively new area of study, especially in developing economies, and 
is currently attracting increasing interest among a wide spectrum of groups such as government, 
industry operators, directors, investors, shareholders and academicians (Inyanga, 2009:5). The 
evolution of corporate governance in Africa is still in its infancy compared to literature available 
in developed economies. Most of what is currently available in Africa are corporate governance 
codes of different countries which were influenced by the OECD principles of corporate 
governance (1999, 2004); the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance (CACG) 
(1999) and King reports of corporate governance in South Africa (Inyang, 2009:7).  
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Corporate failures and financial scandals around the globe gave impetus to the development of 
good corporate governance and information disclosure systems in the emerging economies of 
Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, corporate governance has become a topical issue in a bid to 
promote economic growth and investment. The developments and implementation of corporate 
governance structures in selected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa included in this study are 
given below. 
2.3.1  Corporate governance system in Nigeria 
The provenance of corporate governance systems in Nigeria which covers issues related to 
regulation, control and governance of corporate entities can be traced to the  Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 which replaced the Companies Act of 1968 (Inyang, 2009:8). 
This legal framework originates from British colonial legislation. The development of a 
corporate governance system in Nigeria evolved from the operations of the Nigeria Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 2001, the Commission set up a committee that developed a 
governance code of best practices for public companies in Nigeria, which was adopted in 
2003.The code was aimed at ensuring that managers of and investors in companies carry out 
their duties within a framework of accountability, corporate disclosure and transparency. It 
focused on the responsibilities and functions of the board of directors, audit committees and 
rights and privileges of shareholders. 
 
 In 2006, the Central Bank of Nigeria established another code of corporate governance, this time 
for banks (Ayodele, 2011:43). The code prescribed measures for mitigating weaknesses that that 
had been observed in 25 mega banks that emerged from the banking industry consolidation 
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exercise of 2005. Ayodele (2011:46) further reported that while laws and corporate governance 
codes exist in Nigeria, the major challenge lies in the weakened, inefficient and inadequate legal 
and regulatory frameworks for the enforcement and monitoring of compliance. 
2.3.2  Corporate governance system in East Africa 
The corporate governance regime in Uganda developed through the formulation of  the relevant 
laws and requirements established by various regulatory and supervisory authorities such as 
ICGU, USE the Uganda Securities exchange (USE), Uganda Capital Market Authority (UCMA) 
and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Uganda (ICPAU) (Wanyama et al., 
2009:162). In 2003, the UCMA developed corporate governance guidelines for capital markets 
as a minimum standard for good corporate governance practices by public companies and issuers 
of corporate debt in Uganda. This was in response to the growing importance of governance 
issues in developing economies and aimed at promoting domestic and regional capital market 
growth. It was also in recognition of good governance in capital formation and maximization of 
shareholders’ value as well as protection of investors’ rights. The UCMA also supported the 
development of a code of best practices for corporate governance issued by the ICGU in Uganda 
in 2001, with the objective of strengthening corporate governance practices by listed companies 
and promoting standards of self-regulation so as to bring the level of governance in line with 
international practices. 
 
In Kenya, the Capital Market Authority developed guidelines on corporate governance practices 
by listed companies in 2002. This was in response to the growing importance of governance 
issues both in the emerging and developing economies, and the need to promote growth in 
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domestic and regional capital markets. According to the Kenyan Capital Markets Act (CAP. 
485A:4), the Authority also supported the development of a code of best practice for corporate 
governance issued by the Kenya Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust.  The objective of 
the guidelines is to strengthen corporate governance practices by listed companies in Kenya and 
to promote the standards of regulation so as to align the level of corporate governance with 
international trends. 
2.3.3  Corporate governance system in South Africa 
In 1994, the first King report on corporate governance was published as the first corporate 
governance code of South Africa. It established recommended standards of conduct for boards 
and directors of listed companies, banks and certain state-owned enterprises. In 2002, the King 
III report was published with a revised code of corporate governance covering the responsibility 
of directors, risk management, internal audit, integrated sustainability reporting, accounting and 
auditing. The code co-existed with a number of laws which applied to companies and directors, 
including the Companies Act, and regulations such as Johannesburg Securities Exchange listing 
requirements. 
In 2009, the King III Report was published and became applicable in March 2010. It 
recommended that organizations produce an integrated report instead of an annual financial 
report and a separate sustainability report. The report incorporated a number of global emerging 
governance trends such as alternative dispute resolution, risk-based internal audit, shareholders’ 
approval of non-executive director remuneration and evaluation of board and directors’ 
performance. The report also included new principles to address elements not previously 
included in the King reports, such as governance of information technology and fundamental and 
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affected transactions in terms of directors’ responsibilities during mergers, acquisitions and 
amalgamations. It explains the governance regime as follows: 
 That in the USA, the application of corporate governance was guided by the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act based on “comply or else” basis. It forced all companies to comply with 
Governance Codes and made no provision for extraordinary circumstances. 
 The “comply or explain” basis which was used for corporate governance codes in the 
Commonwealth, South Africa, Britain, and the European Union  allows corporate boards 
to explain why it is not appropriate for them to adopt a corporate governance measure. 
 The United Nations governance code resulted in a new code based on the “adopt or 
explain” principle basis. 
The King III Report is based on “apply or explain” principle, which enables companies to 
operate according to their objectives, without being bound to follow standards which are, by 
nature, inflexible. 
 
On corporate disclosure, Principle 1.13 of the King III Report states that the corporate board 
should ensure that the company makes full and timely disclosure of material matters concerning 
the company. The report indicates that: 
 Effective communication should be maintained with stakeholders. 
 Formal contact with stakeholders is possible through the integrated report. 
 The board should provide a commentary on the company’s financial results to enable an 
investor assess the company’s economic value. 
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 The board should disclose if the company is a going concern. 
 
The report further indicates that companies should seek to inform and generate accurate and 
positive media coverage, communicate with existing and potential investors and ensure clear and 
transparent disclosure at all times. Corporate disclosure is therefore a good tenet of financial 
reporting which is an objective of the accounting conceptual framework developed by the 
Internal Accounting Standards Boards (IASB). 
 
According to Andreasson (2011:656) South Africa’s approach to corporate governance fits in the 
traditional Anglo-American model which includes the following: 
 A single tiered board structure where only shareholders are represented. 
 An active stock exchange that is a leader among emerging markets and ensures that 
financial markets play a dominant role. 
 A general commitment to a market-driven economic policy in which industrial policy 
plays a lesser role manifested in Government’s Growth, Employment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) macroeconomic policy framework. 
In conclusion, the developments show that corporate governance and disclosure regulations in 
South Africa are stronger than governance regulations in East Africa and Nigeria. The 
presentation of the King I, II and III reports in South Africa made suggestions to strengthen, 
corporate governance systems with a view to enhancing the process of financial reporting, 
disclosure of information, and transparency. 
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2.4: THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL 
REPORTING AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
A conceptual framework is defined as a network of linked concepts that provides a detailed 
understanding of a phenomenon (Jabareen, 2009:57). Conceptual frameworks are not just 
collections of concepts, but constructs and variables where each concept plays an integral role.  
According to Kabalski (2009:97), a conceptual framework in accounting constitutes an internally 
consistent system of concepts directly relating to the objectives of financial reporting. The 
objective of general purpose financial reporting in both developing and developed economies is 
to provide information that is useful for capital providers as they make decisions. Capital 
providers include equity investors, lenders and other creditors who include employees whose 
payment is deferred (sometimes for many years), suppliers providing goods on credit, or buyers 
making prepayments for goods or services to be supplied in future (Kabalski, 2009:101).  
 
Financial reporting information is disseminated to stakeholders through disclosure. Disclosure is 
known as one of the fundamental principles of financial reporting systems and  has become a 
tenet of any corporate governance system (Wan and Zunaidah, 2010:216). Disclosure of 
information is a broad concept to the extent that it reveals not only the financial and operational 
practices of a company, but also focuses on managerial incentives and discretions to report 
relevant information (Omran and Abdelrazik, 2013:95). Therefore, for shareholders and other 
stakeholders to make investment decisions about the company, effective and transparent 
disclosure should be made.  
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The purpose of disclosure of corporate information which is made through financial reporting is 
to eliminate the problem of information asymmetry which is worsened by the fact that it is 
inherent in the relationship described by the agency theory where the agent’s decisions are not 
always consistent with the principal’s interests (Kabalski, 2009:98). This study focuses on 
corporate disclosure as a variable used for reporting both financial and non-financial information 
to stakeholders. Disclosure is important for both developing and developed economies and 
therefore, the importance of disclosing accurate information covers all the areas under study in 
the same way. 
2.5  CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
Corporate disclosure is an accounting principle which provides that all information associated to 
firm’s activities must be provided to different user groups properly and in a timely manner 
(Habibi and Shamsi, 2015:202). It is a channel through which existing and potential shareholders 
of a company obtain valuable information (Omran and Abdelrazik, 2013:95). Corporate 
disclosure is an external control mechanism aimed at reducing agency conflicts between insiders 
and outside shareholders or lenders through the provision of information on financial and non-
financial results (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007:10). Hence, corporate disclosure deals with reporting 
items in annual reports that are relevant and material to the decision-making process of users. 
The main role of disclosure is to reduce information asymmetry by requiring corporate managers 
to reveal all the information that affects investment decisions (Meser et al., 2015:257).  If an item 
of information is relevant and material and is not disclosed in company annual reports, then the 
decision-making process by the users of corporate annual reports is likely to be sub-optimal 
28 
 
(Bilal and Jon, 2011:166). Shareholders, for instance, will not have a good  basis for making a 
decision to invest in a company or not. 
 
In listed companies, information is mainly disclosed using annual, interim and quarterly reports, 
company websites, prospectuses, employee reports and announcements made to Capital Market 
Authorities and Security Exchanges. According to Isabel et al. (2011:473) disclosing corporate 
information offers the following advantages: 
 It is useful in the decision-making process and serves as a control system by shareholders 
over managerial activities. This is in line with the agency theory perspective which 
focuses on resolving agency conflicts between shareholders and corporate management 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976:313). 
 Information disclosed is regarded as a signal to capital markets to decrease information 
asymmetries, which is in line with the signaling theory. 
 Information disclosure is associated with improvement in corporate image, increase in 
investor confidence and trust, and greater stock liquidity. 
However, Isabel et al. (2011:474) assert that production and disclosure of information may lead 
to disadvantages that sometimes outweigh the benefits. This is because disclosure involves direct 
costs related to processing, collection and information dissemination. Therefore, there should be 




Furthermore, whether financial or non-financial information included in company annual reports 
is either voluntary or mandatory. Voluntary disclosure is the information in excess of mandatory 
disclosure (Kun eta al., 2008:14). It is the information available to stakeholders at the discretion 
of the company management while for mandatory disclosure, information requirements are laid 
down by statute, professional regulations and listing requirements of stock exchanges. In case of 
non-compliance, companies would face the cost of de-listing from the security exchange 
(Omaima et al., 2009:84). Also, for voluntary disclosure, corporate managers make discretionary 
disclosure for information content they deem important to attract investors and other interested 
stakeholders to their companies (Ioannis et al., 2013:3). However, both mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures are vital in explaining the quantity and quality of corporate disclosure and therefore, 
the two should not be seen as separate elements of financial reporting (Bilal and Jon, 2011:167).  
Poh and Grantley (2013:9) and Rouf (2011:7844) categorize corporate information disclosure as 
corporate and strategic information, financial and capital market information, director and senior 
management information, information on forward looking and future financial forecasts  and 
CSR  information. 
 
Therefore, Information disclosed by corporate entities can broadly be classified as financial and 
non-financial information where the later includes information on governance and CSR (Wen, 
Philomena and Barry, 2013:262). Financial information includes segment information, financial 
review and ratio analysis, foreign currency information, and stock price information. The 
importance of disclosure of financial information is to reduce information asymmetries which are 
likely to create transfer of wealth from owners to managers, leading  current and potential 
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investors to discount share prices (Bhasin and Shaikh, 2013:85). Hence, effective corporate 
governance is fundamental in overseeing the financial reporting and disclosure processes to 
preserve investors’ confidence in capital markets (Jui-Chin and Huey-Lian, 2010:215). 
Disclosure of financial information with a focus on key items displayed in the income statement 
and balance sheet provides an objective measure of disclosure (Overfelt et al., 2010:15). 
Corporate governance, together with the requirements of financial reporting standards, seeks to 
create a safe environment for stakeholders through transparency and financial disclosure thus 
making information on company actions, decisions and existing conditions, accessible, visible 
and understandable to all market participants (Vera, 2013:212). 
 
For non-financial information, disclosure of governance information addresses elements that are 
associated with the governance structure of a company such as general corporate information 
including organization mission and vision, corporate strategy, directors, and employees (Meser et 
al., 2015:263). On the other hand, CSR disclosure provides information regarding product and 
service provision to the society, and involvement in community projects, including philanthropic 
activities and environmental matters (Elinda and Nazli, 2012:293). Corporate social disclosure 
refers to the disclosure of information about a company’s interaction with the society; such 
activities have an effect on employee related activities, involvement in community social 
activities and environmental issues (Parvez and Abdullah, 2011:175). Reporting CSR 
information is vital because it is associated with an ample spectrum of relations in the 
corporation and its various stakeholders as well as the environment (Vicente et al., 2011:296). 
Thus, strong corporate governance may be necessary for sustainable CSR activities (Shin et al., 
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2015:4). For this study, corporate disclosure focuses on disclosure of financial, governance and 
CSR information. Evidence from both developed and developing countries indicates that 
corporate social disclosure is receiving a lot of attention from corporations and stakeholders 
(Parvez and Abdullah, 2011:175).  
2.6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 
Corporate governance has many benefits to developing economies. It helps them to realize high 
and sustainable rates of growth, increase confidence in national economies and strengthen capital 
market operations. It provides mechanisms that are considered  key factors responsible for 
enhancing corporate disclosure and diffuses agency conflicts based on agency theory 
perspectives (Samah, Dahawy, Hussainey and Stapleton, 2012:169). Information disclosure is 
integral to corporate governance and is a key tool for protecting shareholders’ interests by 
reducing information asymmetry and making management accountable to shareholders (Htay, 
2012:3). Poh and Grantley (2013:5) assert that the common tenet in all governance systems is the 
mechanism to facilitate control of management and achievement of maximization of value. 
Therefore, given the role of corporate governance in monitoring company operations; companies 
with good governance systems are likely to cause management to disclose more corporate 
information.   
 
 The foundation of any system of good corporate governance is the disclosure of all corporate 
information (Herath and Freeman, 2012:91). Although literature shows that corporate 
governance strongly affects voluntary disclosure, it is difficult to point out corporate governance 
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factors that highly affect corporate information disclosure (Hongxia and Ainian, 2008:361). Lack 
of good governance systems lead to poor disclosure and corporate failures. Furthermore, the 
demand for corporate disclosure and financial reporting increases day by day due to agency 
conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and investors (Nandi and Ghosh, 
2012:46). One major feature of corporate disclosure is that a firm will generally provide 
information to enable the society; investors and suppliers make specific decisions (Rouf, 
2011:7837). However, the decision to disclose or not to disclose certain information is 
influenced by a variety of corporate governance attributes such as the presence of independent 
non-executive directors, audit committees, board leadership structure and board size. Different 
governance attributes have been identified and the literature on the association between the 
attributes and corporate disclosure is given below. 
2.6.1  CEO Non-duality  
CEO non-duality occurs when the positions of CEO and chairman board of directors are not 
combined and are thus held by different persons. Separation of roles of the CEO from those of 
the chairman board of directors provides checks and balances on managerial behaviour and 
results in the effective monitoring of managerial opportunistic activities (Jing et al., 2008:141). 
This will therefore make the board chairman more independent, with the ability to effectively 
direct and control management activities to ensure that shareholders’ interests are well protected.  
 
However, in the event that the roles of CEO and board chairman are combined (CEO duality), 
the chairs of the boards of directors who are also the CEOs are likely to have the ability to set the 
board’s agenda and hide information more easily from others, especially the non-executive 
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directors (Jiz et al., 2014:604). Therefore, the combination of the two positions (CEO duality) is 
of great concern in corporate governance because it creates a strong power base which could 
erode the board’s ability to exercise effective control (Roshima et al., 2009:215). CEO duality 
signals the absence of separation between decision control and management. It creates power 
concentration which reduces the effectiveness of board monitoring and leads to lack of 
transparency and high information asymmetry (Allegrin, 2013:194). Companies with CEO 
duality are therefore likely to be associated with poor levels of corporate disclosure. 
 
According to Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007:801), one of the board’s vital roles is to monitor top 
management’s performance and therefore allowing the CEO to also serve as board chairperson is 
likely to compromise the desired system of checks and balances which will create a conflict of 
interest. This is also likely to constrain board independence and reduce the possibility of the 
board executing its oversight role well. It also makes it difficult for insecure directors to be 
honest when evaluating the performance of the company. Jing et al. (2008:141) stress that 
restricting decision -making power to a CEO who is also a board chairperson impairs not only 
the board oversight and governance roles, but also affects corporate disclosure policies and 
transparency; while Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:419) indicate  that shareholder activists and 
corporate regulators normally advocate for the separation of the roles of CEO and board 
chairperson to help maintain impartiality in corporate activities, reduce agency costs and 




According to Barako et al. (2006:111), the agency theory does not support CEO duality in 
corporate governance. Separating the CEO and  board chairperson positions is aimed at having, 
as board chairperson, a lead independent (outside) director selected from outside independent 
board members who will effectively monitor the activities of management (Hoskisson et al., 
2009:60). The lead independent director would then serve as a liaison between management and 
other external directors who will no longer have direct contact with the CEO. This helps in not 
only carrying out an independent evaluation of the performance of the CEO, but also protects 
him from unnecessary distraction and influencing the board. 
 
Empirical studies that examined the relationship between CEO non-duality and corporate 
disclosure have shown mixed results. Rouf (2011:7841) examined the relationship between 
governance attributes and voluntary disclosure on a sample of 120 listed non-financial 
companies on the Dhaka stock exchanges in Bangladesh in 2007. The findings indicate that 
corporate voluntary disclosure is higher in firms where the roles of CEO and board chairperson 
are separate. Nandi and Ghosh (2012:55) studied the association between corporate governance 
attributes and corporate disclosure of 60 listed firms on the Bombay stock exchange in India. The 
study covered the period 2000/2001 to 2009/2010 and findings also indicate that the level of 





However, in contrast to the above findings, Allegrini and Greco (2013:214) investigated the 
interplay between governance and disclosure in an agency setting from a sample of 177 non-
financial firms listed on the Italian stock exchange in 2007. The findings revealed a significant 
negative correlation between CEO non-duality and corporate disclosure. These results are also in 
line with studies carried out by Samaha et al. (2012:174) who used a sample of 100 companies 
listed on the Egyptian stock exchange in 2009 to study the extent of corporate governance 
disclosure and its determinants. 
 
Contrary to the above findings, Cheng and Courtenay (2006:286) studied board composition, 
regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure on a sample of 104 listed firms on the Singapore 
stock exchange in 2000. The results revealed no association between CEO duality and the level 
of corporate disclosure. Also Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:424) examined the correlation 
between board structure, ownership and voluntary disclosure on 51 listed companies on the Irish 
stock exchange for the year 2002. The findings revealed a weak insignificant relation between 
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. 
 
In conclusion, although empirical evidence provides mixed findings, the agency theory 
recommends the separation of the CEO and board chairperson’s roles. For instance, according to 
Fama and Jensen (1983:304) individual agents should not exercise exclusive management and 
control rights over the same decision. Principle 1.18 of the King III Report (2009:12) states that 
corporate boards should be led by an independent non-executive chairman who should not be the 
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CEO of the company. According to the same report, the board chairman should be able to 
provide overall corporate leadership, act as a link between the board and management and also 
be able to meet the CEO prior to board meetings to discuss important issues. This cannot happen 
if the roles are not separated.  
2.6.2  Board size 
Board size refers to the total number of members on the board of directors. Prior literature argues 
that board size influences corporate information disclosure, which is one of the strategic 
decisions made by the board of directors.  Board size is important corporate governance attribute 
with a positive influence on the level of corporate financial disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009:15). According to Damagum and Chima (2013:4), corporate governance codes recommend 
that the size of corporate boards should be between 5 and 16, depending on the size and 
diversification of the company. Data from various data sources indicates that the average size of 
boards of directors varies from four for South Africa to 12 in Botswana and Namibia 
(Okeahalam, 2004:362). Nandi and Ghosh (2012:47) assert that large boards are better for 
corporate performance and disclosure because they have a wide range of professionals with 
collective experience and expertise which could help in making better corporate decisions. This 
view is supported by Samaha et al. (2012:170) who argue that large boards lead to an increase in 
diverse financial reporting expertise, higher disclosure quality and are likely to voluntarily 
disclose more information in their annual reports and websites. In addition, each member of the 
board of directors brings a collection of unique and different experiences, attachments and points 
of view to the board (Okeahalam, 2004:362). Hence, a large board is likely to reduce the 
occurrence of information asymmetries and promote value creation and corporate disclosure. 
Therefore, it is expected that companies with a large board size will have directors with diverse 
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experience and expertise who are able to influence company operations and enhance disclosure 
of all corporate information to shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
Contrary to the above view, Ujunwa (2012:661) reports that a large board size has been criticized 
for increasing cost and boardroom squabbles and being, therefore, not effective in exerting 
influence on the disclosure of corporate information. The argument is supported by Stefanescu 
(2013:131) who states that large boards are less effective in reducing agency conflicts compared 
to smaller ones because they are slow in reacting to decisions that require immediate action.  
 
The empirical results of various studies on the effect of board size on corporate disclosure are 
mixed. Harford (2008:540) argues that smaller boards are more efficient in decision-making. It is 
argued that directors serving on small boards can easily communicate to each other and play an 
effective role in improving corporate transparency through corporate internet reporting and 
disclosure (Botti et al., 2013:11).  However in contrast, Harris and Raviv (2006:1799) contend 
that larger boards are better because they provide optimal monitoring and therefore prevent 
corporate managers from achieving their selfish interests; besides, they increase the value of the 
firm. This is possible because larger boards bring a wide range of independent expertise and 
professional skills to the company’s decision-making process. Roshima et al. (2009:215) indicate 
that board size effects increase communication and co-ordination problems, reduce the ability of 
the board to control management, and lead to poor decision-making. Ineffective coordination and 
communication leads to the low quality of corporate disclosure because of the failure by the 
board to carry out its roles efficiently. 
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According to Soliman and Ragab (2013:6) board size is an indicator of diversity in both 
monitoring and advisory roles and larger boards are more likely to have more independent 
directors with valuable experience and hence, they are able to delegate more responsibilities to 
board committees than smaller boards. However, Haslindar and Fazilar (2011:1802) argue that 
because of cohesion needed in corporate strategy and decision-making, a small board size is 
better and could be regarded as a good and superior corporate governance mechanism for firms 
to improve performance, financial reporting and disclosure.  
 
A study by Kent and Stewart (2008:665) examined the link between corporate governance and 
disclosure on transition to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). This was done on 
a sample of 956 listed companies on the Australian Securities Exchange. The findings revealed a 
significant positive relationship between large boards and the level of corporate disclosure. Also 
Ntim et al. (2012:137) studied voluntary corporate governance disclosures by post-Apartheid 
South African corporations on a sample of 291 non-financial companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange for the period 2002-2006. The findings revealed a positive 
relationship between board size and corporate disclosure of governance information. 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:10) examined corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in the 
annual reports of 105 Malaysian listed companies. Findings revealed a significant positive 
association between board size and voluntary disclosure, which suggest that firms with larger 




Contrary to the above findings, some studies have indicated that small boards are more efficient 
and effective and therefore have a positive influence on information disclosure. For instance, 
Htay et al. (2012:212) examined the impact of corporate governance on social and environmental 
information disclosure of 12 listed Malaysian banks between 1996 and 2005. The findings 
revealed that a smaller board size is associated with high information disclosure. Also Stefanescu 
(2013:137) investigated the relationship between the board of directors’ features and level of 
disclosure for 189 listed banking institutions in the European Union for the year 2011. Findings 
indicated that board size is not associated with the level of mandatory disclosure. 
 
The above empirical results show that studies on the association between board size and 
corporate disclosure have not produced conclusive results. For instance, research studies by Ntim 
et al. (2012:138); Allegrin (2013:206); Rouf (2011:7841) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:424) 
revealed a positive association between large board size and voluntary disclosure, while Samaha 
et al. (2012:170) and Cheng and Courtenay (2006:266) found no significant association between 
board size and corporate disclosure. Therefore, this justifies the need to carry out more studies on 
the effectiveness of board size as an attribute of corporate governance on corporate disclosure in 
developing economies with the target of obtaining conclusive results. 
2.6.3  Board composition 
Board composition refers to the constitution of the board of directors of a company with both 
executive and non-executive directors. Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:418) stress that boards of 
directors comprise individuals drawn from top management and others from outside the 
company Non-executive directors may be independent or not. Independent non-executive 
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directors have no relationship with management or the company while non-executive directors 
who are not independent may have some affiliation to the management of the company either 
through family or business relations (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006:264). What is important is that 
independent or not, non-executive directors are not involved in the direct day-to-day operations 
of a company.   
The effectiveness of corporate governance in reducing agency problems between corporate 
managers and investors significantly depends on board composition (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009:5). 
The independence of board composition is measured as the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board and this indirectly reflects the way corporate boards monitor the company’s 
activities (Aboagye et al., 2012:146). It is presumed that boards with independent directors will 
make better and more objective corporate decisions. The purpose of board composition is to 
identify the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and assess its impact on the 
quality of disclosure made through financial reports (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:48).  
Corporate boards are regarded as internal control mechanisms intended to carry out decisions on 
behalf of shareholders and ensure that management behavior is consistent with shareholders’ 
interests (Jing et al., 2008:140). Emma and Juan (2010:608) assert that the board of directors  has 
a fiduciary obligation to shareholders and is responsible for providing corporate strategic 
direction and monitoring. 
 The presence of independent directors on the board is, therefore, pivotal since they contribute 
their experience to the firm and protect its overall interests against potential opportunistic 
behavior that benefits only a narrow constituency of shareholders (Barros, et al., 2013:564).  
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Companies with a strong reputation for transparency because of their high level of information 
disclosure have a strong incentive to defend this reputation by introducing a high number of 
independent directors on the board (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007:12) who will ensure effective 
monitoring.  
 
Non-executive directors are in a better position to monitor management because their own value 
in human capital depends on the performance of the firm on whose boards they sit. This implies 
that for effective decision-making, corporate boards should be empowered to act independently 
from management. Unlike insiders and affiliated directors whose career and personal interests 
are tied to corporate management, external directors need to be free from personal conflicts of 
interest and be able to exercise independent, professional and objective judgments whenever 
there are disagreements with management on corporate operations (Indrarini, 2008:1150). 
 
The effectiveness of the board can be limited if its members are at the same time managers of the 
company. Lim et al. (2007:559) assert that corporate boards engage the services of independent 
and expert directors with majority representation to separate management and control functions. 
However, Rouf (2011:7838) notes that empirical evidence on the importance of non-executive 
directors on the board has been mixed. He states that whereas outside directors are expected to 
be more effective than those inside in maximizing shareholders’ wealth, inside directors are 
believed to contribute more to a company than external directors because of their operational-
firm specific knowledge, skills, and expertise. It is also argued that although executive directors 
42 
 
have specialized skills, expertise, knowledge and experience of the firm’s operations, there is a 
need for independent persons to contribute fresh ideas, objectivity and expertise gained from 
their fields (Htay et al., 2013:123). Furthermore, Huafang and Jianguo (2007:614) carried out a 
study on board composition and corporate voluntary disclosure on a sample of 559 firm 
observations for listed companies on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in China. Results indicated 
that the percentage of independent directors on the board is significant and positively associated 
with corporate voluntary disclosure. This is similar to studies carried out by Emma and Juan 
(2010:621) whose findings suggest that higher independence in corporate boards of directors is 
associated with higher firm voluntary disclosure. Barako (2007:124) investigated determinants of 
voluntary disclosures in Kenyan companies annual reports for a sample of 43 firms listed on the 
Nairobi Stock Exchange for the period 1992-2001. It was found out that although board 
composition was positively and significantly related to disclosure of financial and forward 
looking information, it was significantly and negatively associated with disclosure of general and 
strategic information.  
 
Nandi and Ghosh (2012:55) investigated the association between corporate governance attributes 
and the level of corporate disclosure on a sample of 60 firms listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange in India for the period 2000/2001 to 2009/2010. The findings revealed a negative 
relationship between board composition and the level of corporate disclosure in all the years 
except for 2002/2003, 2007/2008, and 2009/2010. The results suggest that companies with a 
higher ratio of non-executive directors disclose less information. Furthermore, Ezat and El-marsy 
(2008:861) examined the influence of corporate governance variables on the timeliness of 
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corporate internet reporting by 50 Egyptian listed companies on the Cairo and Alexandria stock 
exchanges at the end of 2006. The results indicated that board composition has a significant 
negative relationship with corporate disclosure of future financial events and updating of 
financial information on company websites.  
 
Therefore, extensive literature review reveals that empirical studies on the association between a 
higher ratio of independent non-executive directors and corporate disclosure have produced 
inconclusive results. Hence, there is a need for further studies on the effectiveness of non-
executive directors on corporate boards in influencing disclosure of both financial and non-
financial information.   Studies carried out by Nandi and Ghosh (2012:56); Hafang and Jianguo 
(2007:612); Ali-Janadi et al. (2013:31); Arcay and Vazquez (2005:303); Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008:424); Samah et al. (2012:170) and Htay (2012:11) found a positive association between 
the higher proportion of independent non-executive directors and corporate disclosure. On the 
contrary, studies by Barako et al., (2006:122) and Eng and Mak (2003:340) found a negative 
association between the proportion of outside directors and corporate disclosure. Research 
findings by Allegrini and Greco (2013:206); Khodadadi et al. (2010:161) and Nazli and Pauline 
(2006:242) found no significant relationship between the two variables. 
 
In conclusion, irrespective of existing mixed empirical evidence, the agency theory recommends 
involvement of non-executive directors to promote board independence from management. 
According to Chaung and Leung (2006:13), boards with a higher composition of non-executive 
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directors could result in effective board monitoring and exert a lot of influence on managerial 
decision-making and corporate disclosure. 
 
2.6.4  Composition of audit committees 
Audit committees are a monitoring mechanism formed in high agency cost situations to improve 
the quality of information flow between principals and agents and play a complementary role in 
enhancing corporate information disclosure (Samaha et al., 2012:171). The monitoring of 
corporate activities by audit committees is enhanced if the independence of the committee is 
increased by the appointment of more non-executive directors (Nurul and Sherliza, 2011:292). 
Nandi and Ghosh (2012:48) suggest that effective and independent audit committees enhance 
financial reporting and disclosure quality by fulfilling various responsibilities such as the 
implementation of appropriate accounting policies, review of accounts and financial statements, 
and ensuring that the internal controls in place are sufficient.  
 
The independence of audit committees helps to reduce information asymmetry between 
controlling shareholders and other corporate investors (Woidtke and Yeh, 2013:2).  Independent 
audit committees allow accurate assessment of top management decisions and performance to 





Won et al. (2011:625) argue that companies with independent audit committees are less likely to 
manipulate earnings and more likely to voluntarily disclose all financial and non-financial 
information. However, they further indicate that a the mere presence of the audit committees 
may not necessarily translate into better financial reporting quality. Nurul and Sherliza 
(2011:292) assert that the role of an audit committee is to safeguard an organization through its 
authority to question corporate management regarding the way financial reporting and disclosure 
responsibilities are handled as well as making sure that where necessary, corrective actions are 
taken. Large audit committees also help in discovering and resolving financial reporting and 
disclosure problems because the increase in size of the committee brings on board more skills 
and expertise, hence improving the quality of oversight. 
 
 
The agency theory suggests that the independent members of the audit committee can help 
shareholders to monitor the activities of corporate managers and hence increase the effectiveness 
and efficiency of corporate boards in monitoring financial reporting processes of the company 
(Aboagye et al., 2012:147)., The presence of   non- executive members on audit committees is 
likely to help in the monitoring of managerial activities and hence, enhance corporate 
information disclosure. 
 
Studies on the role of audit committees in enhancing corporate disclosure have produced mixed 
results. For instance, Jing et al. (2012:146) examined the effect of audit committee characteristics 
on intellectual capital disclosure for 100 listed firms on the London Stock Exchange at the end of 
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2005. Whereas results indicate a significant and positive relationship between the size of the 
audit committee and intellectual capital disclosure, the association between audit committee 
independence and intellectual capital disclosure was not significant. Aboagye et al. (2012:157) 
investigated the interrelationship between corporate governance and disclosure practices of 
Ghanaian listed companies and established that there was no association between the 
composition of the audit committee and the level of corporate disclosure. 
2.6.5  Ownership structure 
Ownership structure is one of the corporate governance characteristics that influence corporate 
disclosure (Barako et al., 2006:111). Laivi (2009:15) and Donnelly and Mulachy (2008:420), 
categorize types of ownership structure as ownership concentration, government ownership, 
foreign ownership, institutional ownership and managerial/director ownership. A research study 
by Barako (2007:116) on the Nairobi Securities Exchange identified concentrated (block 
shareholder), foreign, institutional and director ownership as possible types of ownership 
structures that could influence the corporate disclosure of listed companies. This study focused 
on concentrated (block) ownership of shares and director ownership structures because data on 
other types of ownership structure cannot easily be established, especially for listed firms in East 
Africa and Nigeria. 
a. Concentrated (block shareholder) ownership 
Concentrated share ownership is a percentage of shares held by substantial shareholders; that is, 
shareholdings of 5% or more (Huafang and Jianguo, 2007:607). Ownership concentration can 
also be measured by the proportion of shares held by the top five shareholders (Poh and 
Grantley, 2013:14). If a company’s ownership structure is not concentrated, then it is widely held 
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or dispersed. In such cases, company shares will not be held in the hands of a few large 
shareholders, but rather, spread to a number of investors (Nazli, 2007:255).In such a company, 
corporate disclosure is used as a control and monitoring tool for reducing agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:308). 
 
According to Ezat and El-Masry (2008:853), companies with a share ownership structure that is 
diffuse or spread (widely held), tend to disclose more information to shareholders than those 
with a concentrated ownership structure. However, Adawi and Rwegasira (2012:246) argue that 
controlling shareholders in a company normally have a strong incentive to monitor management 
actions and therefore, concentrated share ownership is an influential attribute of corporate 
governance that ultimately results into increase in corporate information disclosure. This 
argument is supported by Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006:209) who state that block 
shareholders and active institutional shareholders lead to more efficiency in monitoring of 
management and less managerial opportunistic behavior which benefits all corporate 
stakeholders. Contrary to this, Poh and Grantley (2013:14) stress that firms with a concentrated 
ownership structure are expected to disclose less information and those with diffused ownership 
will disclose more information to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry in line with 
the agency theory. 
 
The effect of block shareholder ownership on corporate disclosure may be twofold. With 
controlling power, block shareholders may manipulate disclosure levels to maximize their 
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interests (Haiyan and Ahsan, 2009:276). On the other hand, they may also serve as effective 
monitors by encouraging corporate managers to provide timely and credible disclosure. The 
potential for agency conflicts is higher in companies with lower ownership concentration 
because of conflicting interests between contracting parties (Ferreira et al., 2012:282). Such 
companies have a large number of shareholders that are not directly involved in the day-to-day 
operations and management of the company and consequently, agency costs may arise due to 
information asymmetry between shareholders and management. Basing on agency theory, 
potential conflict in interests between management and shareholders is higher in companies with 
dispersed ownership structure (widely held companies) because investors with a small 
percentage of shares have little power to influence management decisions (Desoky and Mousa, 
2012:54). Therefore, it is expected that companies with more dispersed share ownership will 
disclose more information than companies with more concentrated share ownership. 
 
 Empirical studies that have analyzed the association between concentrated ownership structure 
and corporate disclosure have not produced conclusive findings. For example, Haiyan and Ahsan 
(2009:290) carried out a study on the impact of different types of ownership concentration on 
annual report voluntary disclosures. It applied a panel data regression analysis on 119 listed 
companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange and New Zealand Alternative Exchange for the 
period 2001-2005. The findings revealed a significant positive relationship between block 




Similary, Poh and Grantley (2013:15) examined the association between corporate governance 
and different types of voluntary disclosure on a sample of 100 Malaysian listed firms for the 
period 1996-2006. The study revealed that concentrated ownership structure (block 
shareholding) is significantly and positively associated with disclosure of information related to 
financial, capital market data and CSR. Their findings are also consistent with studies carried out 
by Zourarakis (2009:99) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007:619), whose findings revealed a 
significant positive relationship between concentrated ownership structure and increased 
disclosure of corporate information. 
 
However, contrary to the above findings, Laivi (2009:27) investigated the association between 
ownership structure and Public Announcements’ disclosure on a sample of 52 listed companies 
on three European developing stock exchanges in the Baltic States—  Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania — for the period 2001-2005. The findings revealed a significant negative association 
between ownership concentration and quality of public announcements information disclosure.  
Studies by Htay et al. (2012:202) also revealed a significant association between lower block 
shareholder ownership and higher information disclosure. This implies that companies with 
higher concentrated share ownership disclose less information.  
 
The findings are consistent with studies by Ntim et al. (2012:219); Tsamenyi et al. (2007:329); 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008:859) and Samaha et al. (2012:174) which revealed a negative 
association between ownership concentration and corporate disclosure. However, findings by 
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Mohamed (2012:60) on the determinants of corporate voluntary disclosures from a sample of 
Tunisian listed firms revealed that diffused ownership (lower ownership concentration) is not 
associated with the level of voluntary disclosure. 
 
In conclusion, according to Kang and Gray (2011:406), the agency and stakeholder theories 
suggest that a company with low concentration of ownership indicates the existence of a more 
diverse group of stakeholders and subsequently, the company has more incentives to disclose 
information to respond to the different perspectives of stakeholders. Therefore, companies with a 
highly concentrated share ownership are expected to disclose less information compared to 
companies where share ownership is highly spread. 
b. Director ownership 
Director ownership describes the shareholding of directors and senior managers in the company.  
Companies where directors hold a significant number of shares are described as closely held or 
owner managed. In such companies, public accountability may be limited because of the 
minimal interests of  outside shareholders (Nazli, 2007:255). Nazli et al. (2006:231) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976:313) argue that director ownership can help reduce agency costs because a 
manager who owns a significant number of company shares bears consequences and also enjoys 
the benefits of managerial actions that deplete or increase company value. They add that a 
manager who owns a small proportion of company shares has greater incentives to pursue his 
own interests and less incentive to maximize job performance. In this case, outside shareholders 
who own the majority of company shares will need to increase the monitoring of managerial 
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behavior to reduce the associated increase in agency costs. This is done by demanding increased 
disclosure of corporate information. 
 
According to Htay et al. (2012:200), directors who hold substantial numbers of shares in a 
company might not want to disclose information to the public because they could use their 
discretionary powers to spend corporate resources in a manner that serves their own interests at 
the expense of other shareholders. Accordingly, a negative correlation between director share 
ownership and corporate information disclosure will be expected. However, Laivi (2009:15) 
stresses that if senior directors have shareholdings in the company, then managerial interests in 
the company will be expected to be in line with those of other shareholders and therefore 
corporate managers will have less interest in hiding information from investors. This will lead to 
an increase in information disclosure. This argument is supported by Roshima et al. (2009:217) 
who state that agency theory predicts that the Principal-Agent conflict between managers and 
shareholders will arise when managers hold little equity in the company and this may encourage 
them to engage in undesired opportunistic behaviors. This implies that when managerial share 
ownership is increased, agency conflicts will reduce and corporate managers will be motivated to 
disclose more information to all investors. 
Existing research studies on the association between director share ownership and corporate 
disclosure have not been conclusive. For instance, Hongxia and Ainian (2008:367) examined the 
impact of corporate governance on corporate disclosure in 100 non-financial Chinese listed firms 
for the period 2003-2005. The findings revealed a positive association between managerial 
ownership and voluntary disclosure. The results were consistent with studies carried out by Htay 
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(2012:17); Samaha et al. (2012:174); Huafang and Jianguo (2007:9) and Haiyan and Ahsan 
(2009:20), whose findings also revealed a positive relationship between managerial ownership 
and voluntary disclosure, suggesting that managerial share ownership gives corporate 
management a sense of ownership status and therefore, they will be free to disclose all the 
available information. Furthermore, disclosing corporate information is likely to improve the 
company’s competiveness and build future investor confidence in stock market operations. 
However, contrary to the above findings, studies by Eng and Mak (2003:340) found a negative 
association between managerial share ownership and corporate disclosure, while the study 
findings by Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:425) revealed no relationship between the two 
variables. 
In conclusion, agency theory discourages increased managerial share ownership if companies are 
to effectively disclose information to all interested stakeholders. A reduction in managerial 
(director) ownership of shares implies that a company has more outside shareholders who put 
pressure on corporate managers to disclose more information than what is demanded by laws or 
regulations (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008:5). Therefore, it is expected that companies with a 
higher proportion of director ownership of shares disclose less information to the public. 
2.7  CONTROL VARIABLES 
For purposes of empirical analysis and the need to minimize the impact of other variables that 
may explain the relationship between corporate governance and information disclosure, three 
control variables were included in the regression models. Various empirical studies such as Rouf 
(2011:2); Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:7); Nandi and Ghosh (2012:49) and Jiang and Habib 
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(2009:291) have identified firm size, profitability and leverage as the main control variables that 
influence corporate disclosure. 
2.7.1  Firm size 
Firm size has persistently been found to be significantly and positively associated with corporate 
disclosure levels and therefore large firms are expected to follow better corporate disclosure 
practices (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:47). 
According to Desoky and Mousa (2012:55), large firms voluntarily disclose more information in 
annual reports to resolve agency conflicts and can always be in position to access and benefit 
from financial markets as long as they disclose all available information. Furthermore, large 
companies tend to have better internal management information systems as a result of their 
varied activities and are, therefore, able to disclose more information (Ferreira et al., 2012:282).  
Managers of large companies are more likely to realize the possible benefits of better disclosure 
while small companies are more likely to feel that full information disclosure could endanger 
their competitive position (Rouf, 2011:7837).  In addition, large firms tend to disclose more 
information because they are more exposed to public scrutiny and also possess sufficient 
resources for collecting, analyzing and presenting extensive amounts of data at minimal costs 
(Khalid, 2006:479). Large firms have been a focus of corporate disclosure studies because 
agency theorists suggest that agency problems and costs are higher in large firms due to diffuse 
ownership structure (Mohamed, Junaid, Poh-ling and Anbalagan, 2014:53).  
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2.7.2  Leverage 
Ezat and Al-Marsy (2008:852) describe leverage as the use of financial resources such as debt 
and borrowed funds in a company to increase the return on equity. It is the ratio of total liabilities 
to total assets (Poh and Grantley; 2013:14). Managers of highly leveraged companies are 
expected to disclose more information to enable creditors evaluate the companies’ ability to meet 
their financial obligations. Accordingly, agency theory posits that higher monitoring costs would 
be incurred by firms that are highly leveraged and to reduce this, firms are expected to disclose 
more information (Laivi, 2009:16; Desoky and Mousa, 2012:55; Akhtaruddin and Hasnah, 
2010:73)  
2.7.3  Profitability 
According to signaling theory, profitable firms disclose more information in annual reports to 
differentiate them from poor performers (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:49). The managers of these 
companies are motivated to disclose more financial information to support the continuance of 
their positions and remuneration and to signal institutional confidence (Rouf, 2011: 7837; 
Khalid, 2006:483).   
While corporate managers are usually reluctant to give detailed information about non-profitable 
companies (Oluwaremi, 2014:184),, profitable companies will tend to disclose more information 
to show that they have achieved better performance so as to attract more investors. 
Generally empirical results support the view that the above control factors influence corporate 
disclosure. For instance, research results by Ntim et al. (2012:138) and Samaha et al. (2012:174) 
revealed a positive association between firm size, profitability and corporate disclosure. 
Similarly, findings by Barako et al. (2006:122) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007:612) revealed a 
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positive and significant association between firm size, leverage and voluntary disclosure. 
However, findings by Tsamenyi et al. (2007:328) revealed insignificant positive correlation 
between leverage and disclosure while Ali-Janadi et al. (2013:32) found an insignificant positive 
relationship between profitability and voluntary disclosure.  
2.8   SUMMARY OF EXISTING STUDIES  
From the literature review, several critical arguments have been raised about the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in influencing disclosure of financial, governance and CSR information. A 
summary of several empirical findings of the previous studies is therefore given in table 2.1, 
clearly presenting details of   the author, year of publication, methods used and the findings. 
Table 2.1: Summary of previous studies and findings 
Author and year 
of publication 
Topic and country Sample and country Significant 
explanatory 
variables (effect on 
disclosure) 
Rouf (2011) Corporate 
characteristics, 
governance 
attributes and the 
extent of voluntary 
disclosure in 
Bangladesh. 
A sample of 120 listed 
non-financial companies in 
Daka Stock Exchanges 
(DSE) in 2007. The study 
used relative un-weighted 




structure (CEO non 
duality) has a 
positive effect 
Board size has a 
positive effect. 
 






the level of corporate 
disclosure: Evidence 
from Indian listed 
firms.  
A sample of 60 firms 
listed on Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) for the 
period 2001-2009. 
Disclosure items were 
selected based on standard 
and poor (2008) model and 
un-weighted disclosure 
index was calculated. 
 Board size and 
CEO non-duality 
(Separation of roles 
of CEO and board 




directors on the 








The extent of 
corporate 
governance 
disclosure and its 
determinants in a 
developing market: 
The case of Egypt. 
The study examines 
annual reports and 
websites of most active 
100 Egyptian companies 
on the Egyptian stock 
exchange. Corporate 
governance disclosure data 
were measured using a 
content analysis technique. 
CEO duality (a 
combination of the 
roles of chief 
executive officer 
and chairman board 
of directors) has a 
negative effect. 
Board size and 
director ownership 
have no effect. 
 Higher proportion 
of non-executive 
directors of board of 
directors (positive 
effect). 














The study examines 
disclosure of 74 
information items which 
were financial, non- 
financial as well as 
strategic in nature for 
Malaysian listed firms, 
using the un-weighted 
approach of scoring 
selected disclosure items. 
Both board size and 




on the board have a 
positive significant 












Banks: Panel Data 
Analysis. 
Data was collected from a 
sample of 12 listed 
companies in Malaysia 
whose main activity is 
banking from 1996- 2005. 
Panel data analysis was 
applied using the 
Generalized least square 
method. 
 Board size, and 




on the board, has a 
positive effect.  
A higher proportion 
of block ownership 










disclosure? The case 
of the banking 
system. 
Data was collected from 
189 banking institutions in 
27 European Union 
countries listed on their on 
their main stock 
exchanges. Data collection 
was based on information 
provided by banks’ 
websites through their 
annual reports   
Higher percentage 
of non-executive 
directors on the 
board of directors 









Data was obtained from 51 
annual reports of 
companies listed on the 
Irish market as of June 3, 
2002. The study used a 
disclosure index designed  
based on previous studies, 
to estimate the amount and 
detail of non-mandatory 
information disclosed in 
the annual reports 
Higher proportion 
of non-executive 
directors on the 









Data was collected from 
annual reports of a sample 
of 124 Malaysian firms 
listed on the Main Board 
of the Bursa Malaysia. The 
sample excluded banks, 
insurance firms and 
financial institutions. An 
information disclose 
checklist was designed 
based on previous 
literature and an un-
weighted disclosure index 
was designed with a total 
of 64 items that were 
identified in compliance 
with voluntary disclosure 
items provided by the 
listed firms in Malaysia. 
Director ownership 





of the audit 
committee has a 
positive effect. 













sample of 150 non-
financial companies listed 
on the main board of 
Bursa Malaysia in 2006. 
Corporate social 
responsibility disclosure 
items were extracted from 
annual reports and 
company websites using 
the un-weighted disclosure 
approach. 
ownership of shares 




on audit committees 
(all have a positive 
effect). 
Adelopo (2011) Voluntary disclosure 
practices amongst 
listed companies in 
Nigeria. 
Data was collected from 
annual reports of a sample 
of listed companies on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange. 




of shares have a 
negative effect.  
Hossain (2008)  The extent of 
disclosure in annual 
reports of banking 
companies: The case 
study of India. 
Data was collected from 
annual reports of 38 
banking companies listed 
on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) and 
National Stock Exchange 
(NSE) in India. Un-
weighted disclosure index 
was designed and used to 
collect data on corporate 
disclosure. 
A high proportion 
of non-executive 
independent 
directors on the 





reporting and board 
representation: 
Evidence from the 
Kenyan banking 
sector.  
Data was collected from 
annual reports of 40 
Kenyan banks. Disclosure 
items were selected using 
un-weighted disclosure 
index designed based on 
prior research studies 
A higher ratio of 
nonexecutive 
directors on the 








from Italian listed 
companies 
Data was collected from 
annual reports of a sample 
of 177 non-financial 
companies listed on Italian 
Stock Exchange in 2007. 
The study used un-
weighted disclosure 
CEO duality (A 
combination of 
roles of CEO and 
chairman board of 
directors) has a 
negative effect. 
Board size has a 
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scoring index based on the 
information disclosed in 
the 2007 annual reports, to 
measure the level of 












from the US 
Banking Sector. 
Data was collected from 
US listed national 
commercial banks for the 
period 2009 to 2011. Data 
on corporate social 
responsibility disclosure 
was collected by scoring 
the contents of corporate 
social responsibility in the 
annual reports. 
Board size and a 
high proportion of 
independent non-
executive directors 
on the board, has a 
positive effect. 
CEO duality (a 
combination of the 
roles of CEO and 
the chairman board 








Evidence from listed 
companies in China 
The study used a sample 
of companies listed on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange 
in China. It excluded firms 
in the financial sector 
(banks, insurance and 
other financial firms) 
because of the nature of 
their disclosure 
requirements. A voluntary 
disclosure index was used 
based on un-weighted 
scoring approach 
supported by several prior 
studies. 
Higher proportion 
of block ownership 
of shares has a 
positive effect. 
CEO duality (a 
combination of 
roles of CEO and 
chairman board of 














economic crisis.  
Data was collected from 
annual reports of non-
financial companies listed 
on Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) in 
Malaysia. A disclosure 
index was generated based 




ownership of shares 




of board of 
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was applied by scoring 1 
where an item is disclosed 
and 0 if not disclosed. 
directors) and block 
ownership of shares 
have no effect. 
Frily and Mekel 
(2014) 
The effect of firm 
size, profitability, 
leverage and board 





Data was collected from 
annual reports of a sample 
of companies listed on 
Indonesia Stock Exchange 
for the period 2005-2008. 
Findings were obtained 
using multiple linear 
regression analysis. 
Board size has a 
positive effect. 
Nauman (2013) Effect of Duality, 






Data was gathered from 
annual reports of a sample 
of 53 companies listed on 
the Karachi Stock 
Exchange in Pakistan for 
the fiscal years 2007 to 
2011. It used a corporate 
governance disclosure 
checklist which included 
29 items to score the 
firm’s level of disclosure. 
Scores of 1 and 0 were 
used to mark presence and 
absence respectively, of 
the item in the disclosure 
check list. 
Board size has a 
positive effect. 
CEO duality (a 
combination of 





on the board have 
no effect. 





Data was collected from 
the 2006 and 2009 annual 
reports of non-financial 
companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia. A self 
constructed CSR 
disclosure checklist 
containing 23 items was 
used to collect data based 
on the un-weighted 
approach whereby 1 was 
awarded if an item is 
disclosed and 0 otherwise. 
Board size has a 
positive effect.  
A higher proportion 
of independent non-
executive directors 
on the board has no 
effect. 
Director ownership 
of shares has a 
negative effect. 
 
Baros (2014) Corporate 
Governance and 
Data was collected from a 






Disclosure in France 
financial listed French 
firms during 2006-2009. 
Board, audit committee 
and director ownership 
data were extracted from 
company annual reports. 
Voluntary disclosure was 
measured using self 
constructed disclosure 
index based on prior 
studies. A value of 1 was 
assigned when an item was 
disclosed and zero 
otherwise. The un-
weighted approach of 
scoring disclosure items 
was used. 





on the board and 
higher proportion of 
director ownership 
of shares have a 
positive effect. 









Data was collected from 
annual reports of 27 
Government-linked 
companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for the years 
2005 and 2007. The extent 
of CSR disclosure was 
determined by applying a 
disclosure check list on the 
selected corporate annual 
reports. The check list was 
adopted from Moh Ghazali 
(2007). Each disclosure 
item was equally waited 
and awarded a score of 1 if 
disclosed and 0 if not. 





on the board has a 
negative effect 
 
2.9 SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The chapter has reviewed and evaluated the theoretical framework of corporate governance and 
the regulatory systems and developments of corporate governance in Nigeria, East Africa and 
South Africa. It has also evaluated the existing literature on corporate disclosure and the impact 
of individual corporate governance attributes on information disclosure. The chapter has 
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indicated that empirical studies on the application of corporate governance system in both 
developed and developing economies is based on the agency, stakeholder and stewardship 
theories. The agency theory forms the basis of describing how agency conflicts that arise 
between shareholders and managers of a company can be resolved through effective corporate 
governance mechanisms and enhanced information disclosure.  
 
On the other hand, the stakeholder theory explains how the scope of corporate governance covers 
not only the interests of shareholders and managers, but also includes other stakeholders’ 
interests, to which companies have an obligation and responsibility to satisfy through 
strengthening governance systems. The stewardship theory departs from the agency theory which 
assumes that managers are self-interested; explaining instead that managers have interests similar 
to those of shareholders and therefore governance systems should allow managers to make 
decisions that enhance firm performance, transparency and disclosure. The chapter has also 
described the preference of the agency theory over other theories as the basis for this study since 
it is widely used in empirical studies that evaluate the efficacy of corporate governance systems 
in mitigating agency conflicts through enhanced corporate disclosure. 
 
The chapter has evaluated existing empirical studies on the impact on corporate disclosure of the 
following variables: CEO non-duality, board composition and board size, composition of audit 
committee, block share ownership and director ownership. Although some results show that 
corporate governance attributes have a significant influence on corporate disclosure, others do 
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not reveal any significant impact at all. This has created gaps in the already existing literature 
and laid a basis for investigating further the impact of these attributes on the disclosure of 













3.1  INTRODUCTION 
The study is based on the premise that corporate governance attributes help to reduce the agency 
conflicts between corporate management and shareholders by improving disclosure of corporate 
information. The study focuses on the efficacy of corporate governance attributes in ensuring 
that companies disclose all the required information to stakeholders. Disclosure of corporate 
information is vital in guiding stakeholders to evaluate and select investment opportunities which 
ultimately result into increase in corporate investments, earnings and economic growth.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design and methodology used to carry out 
empirical tests and analysis in this study. Research methodology describes the way in which a 
research problem is identified and systematically solved to obtain empirical evidence. It explains 
how research is scientifically done and involves studying various logical steps adopted by a 
researcher in solving the research problem. Methodology also lays down the philosophy of the 
research process (Bailey, 2008:34). It includes the assumptions and values that serve as the 
rationale for the research and the standards that the researcher uses for analysing data, 
interpreting research findings and making conclusions. 
 
The chapter first describes the summary of null hypotheses and the research econometric model 
which were adopted for the study after a critical review of literature. It also discusses the 
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methods used to collect data from South Africa, Nigeria and East Africa and the basis of 
measurements for corporate governance attributes and control variables. The chapter further 
describes how a disclosure index was constructed to determine the level of corporate disclosure 
and finally, it explains the choice of statistical tools for data analysis and the reasons for the use 
of the random effects model for regression analysis. 
3.2  RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
The study used a quantitative approach, in which panel data was obtained and analysed to 
examine the impact of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of corporate information as 
per the study objectives and hypotheses. The panel data used the stock market data and corporate 
governance information of listed firms in South Africa, East Africa and Nigeria. The quantitative 
approach was used because of the need to examine the relationship that exists among the 
variables under investigation (Creswell, 2009:32).  
 
According to Gujarati (2003:637), panel data is preferred in quantitative analysis over cross-
sectional data because it combines time series of cross section observations, which gives more 
informative data, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and more 
efficiency. Use of panel data has the advantage of having the potential to resolve issues and 
inherent limitations of using cross sectional models (Aboagye et al, 2012:149). A comparative 
analysis was carried out from using firms listed on securities exchanges in South Africa, Nigeria 
and East Africa. 
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3.3   RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The primary objective of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance on the 
disclosure of corporate information. Disclosure of material information by companies reduces 
information asymmetry hence checking agency conflicts between corporate management and 
shareholders (Htay et al., 2012:6). The corporate governance attributes covered in this study 
include CEO non-duality, board size, board composition, composition of audit committees, block 
ownership of shares and director ownership of shares. The study also covers profitability, firm 
size and leverage as control variables. The study describes corporate disclosure as exposure of 
financial and non-financial information (information on governance and CSR). The hypotheses 
were developed based on the extensive theoretical and literature review in chapter two and are 
stated below. 
3.3.1  CEO non-duality 
CEO non-duality entails clear separation of leadership roles between the company CEO and 
chairman board of directors. This promotes board independence which is attained through the 
separation of leadership roles and is necessary to exert pressure on management to disclose more 
material corporate information in line with the interests of shareholders (Htay et al., 2012:4). 
Empirical results show that separation of leadership roles positively affects disclosure of 
information (Rouf, 2011:26) while results by Samaha et al. (2012:176) show that CEO duality (a 
combination of leadership roles) has a negative significant effect on corporate disclosure. A 
comprehensive theoretical and literature review shows that CEO non-duality has a positive 
significant influence on disclosure of corporate information and therefore both null and 
alternative hypotheses are stated as follows: 
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H0: Separation of the role of chairman board of directors and CEO has no 
 significant effect on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in
 developing economies.  
H1: Separation of the role of chairman board of directors and CEO has a positive 
 significant effect on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in
 developing economies.  
H0: Separation of the role of chairman board of directors and CEO has no 
 significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies in 
 developing economies.  
H1: Separation of the role of chairman board of directors and CEO has a positive 
 significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies in 
 developing economies. 
3.3.2  Board size 
Board size is a vital corporate governance attribute (Nandi and Ghosh, 2012:47) and is expected 
to have a positive effect on disclosure of corporate information (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009:8). The 
implication is that large boards have directors with diverse professional expertise, skills and 
experience and are therefore more effective in enhancing corporate disclosure (Stefanescu, 
2013:131). From the agency theory perspective and a review of literature, it is believed that 
board size has a positive significant effect on disclosure of corporate information. Hence both 
null and alternative hypotheses are stated as follows: 
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H0: Board size has no significant effect on disclosure of financial information by listed 
companies in developing economies. 
H1: Board size has a positive significant effect on disclosure of financial information by 
listed companies in developing economies. 
H0: Board size has no significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information by 
 listed companies in developing economies. 
H1: Board size has a positive significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information 
 by listed companies in developing economies. 
3.3.3  Board composition 
Based on the agency theory, a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board enhances the independence of boards to make decisions and encourages management to 
disclose all material information (Htay et al., 2012:4). It is therefore believed that boards with a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors are effective in monitoring the activities of 
corporate management to ensure that all the relevant information is disclosed to shareholders. In 
contrast, Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007:560) assert that instead, it is the executive directors 
who play an important role in enhancing disclosure because they are the ones involved in day-to-
day management and therefore would be able to disclose more information to signal to the 
market that they are not engaged in making suboptimal decisions. Through a theoretical and 
literature review, it is indicated that a higher proportion of non executive directors on the board 
has a positive significant effect on disclosure of corporate information. The null and alternative 
hypotheses are therefore stated as follows: 
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H0: Higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board has no significant effect 
 on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
H1: Higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board has a positive significant 
 effect  on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in developing 
 economies. 
H0: Higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board has no significant effect 
 on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies in developing economies.   
H1: Higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board has a positive significant 
 effect  on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies in developing 
 economies. 
3.3.4  Composition of Audit committee 
Audit committees help in providing means for review of company processes to produce financial 
data and therefore, they are vital in producing high quality financial reporting (Roshima et al., 
2009:216). The presence of more independent non-executive directors on audit committees 
enhances disclosure of corporate information (Barros, 2013:564). A review of literature shows 
that audit committee independence has a positive effect on disclosure of corporate information. 
Based on theoretical and literature review, the following hypotheses are stated: 
H0: A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee has no 
 significant effect on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in 
 developing economies. 
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H1: A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee has a positive 
 significant effect on disclosure of financial information by listed companies in 
 developing economies. 
H0: A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee has no 
 significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies in 
  developing economies. 
H1: A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee has a 
 positive significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information by listed companies 
 in developing economies. 
3.3.5  Block  ownership of shares 
Block shareholding presents a situation where shares are concentrated in the hands of a few 
individuals and/or institutions. Large block shareholders may prefer less disclosure of corporate 
information. This is because they may have a strong incentive to search for private pre-disclosure 
information and therefore a negative relationship between block share ownership and disclosure 
of corporate information is expected (Haiyan and Ahsan, 2009:277). Empirical results from 
previous studies have produced mixed results. For instance, Huafang and Jianguo (2007:614) 
revealed that block ownership of shares has a positive significant influence while Adelopo 
(2011:343) and Htay et al. (2012:204) revealed a negative influence on corporate disclosure. 
However, a comprehensive literature review indicates that block ownership of shares has a 




H0: Block share ownership has no significant effect on disclosure of financial information 
 by listed companies in developing economies. 
H1: Block share ownership has a negative significant effect on disclosure of financial 
 information by listed companies in developing economies. 
H0: Block share ownership has no significant effect on disclosure of non-financial 
 information by listed companies in developing economies. 
H1 :Block share ownership has a negative significant effect on disclosure of non-financial 
 information by listed companies in developing economies. 
3.3.6  Director share ownership 
Director ownership describes the proportion of total shares held by directors and senior managers 
of a company. According to Htay et al. (2012: 198), top senior managers are normally informed 
about company activities and might be less motivated to put pressure on management to disclose 
more information. However, Laivi (2009:15) asserts that senior directors who hold shares also 
have long-term interests in the company, benefit from dividends and therefore, they are less 
motivated to expropriate company resources for their personal benefit. Through literature review, 
it is expected that director share ownership has a negative significant influence on disclosure of 
corporate information. The following hypotheses are stated to describe the relationship between 
director ownership of shares and disclosure of corporate information. 
H0: Director Ownership of shares has no significant effect on disclosure of financial 
 information by listed companies in developing economies. 
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H1: Director Ownership of shares has a negative significant effect on disclosure of 
 financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
H0: Director Ownership of shares has no significant effect on disclosure of non-financial
 information by listed companies in developing economies. 
H1: Director Ownership of shares has a negative significant effect on disclosure of non-
 financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
3.4  THE RESEARCH MODEL 
This section presents the multiple regression model used to describe the impact of corporate 
governance attributes on corporate disclosure. The model describes the relationship between 
independent, dependent and control variables in this study. The independent variables include: 
CEO non-duality (CEO), board size (BS), board composition (BC),  composition of audit 
committees (CAC), block share ownership (BO) and director share ownership (DO). Corporate 
disclosure is the dependent variable in the study and based on existing studies by Poh and 
Grantley (2013:6); Rouf (2011:7844) and Akhtaruddin and Hasnah (2010:224), corporate 
disclosure (CD) is categorized into disclosure of financial information and non-financial 
information (information on governance and CSR). For purposes of empirical analysis and the 
need to minimize the impact of other variables that  could explain the extent of corporate 
disclosure, three control variables have been identified through literature review and are also 
included in the regression model. These are: firm size (FS), leverage (Lev) and profitability (P). 
Based on the theoretical and existing empirical studies such as those carried out by Samaha et al. 
(2012:172), Khan, Muttakin and Siddiqui (2012:214) and Poh and Grantley (2013:11, a  
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modified model  that put into consideration availability of data was developed using the 
following econometric equation. 











Where CD: Corporate disclosure 
αO:  Intercept term 
ei and  ut  : Between and within entity error terms 
α1 ….. α9: Slope coefficients 
 
The discussion of attributes included in the model is given in sections 3.3 (Research 
Hypotheses), 3.7.1 (measurement of corporate governance attributes and control variables) and 
3.7.2 (measurement and data collection for corporate disclosure). According to Roshima 
(2009:219) firm size (total assets) and profitability (ROE and ROA) have been widely used by 
past researchers as control variables and the use of these variables improves the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and corporate social disclosure. In addition, 
Desoky and Mousa (2012:55) assert that firms with higher gearing levels disclose more 
information to give creditors confidence about the company’s ability to settle creditors’ 
obligations.  
3.5  STUDY PERIOD 
The study uses panel data covering a period of four years:  2010 to 2013.The choice of the period 
is justified by the following reasons. 
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a. For South African listed firms, this was a period during which the King III Report that 
came into effect in 2009, was being implemented. The Report outlines the application of 
several corporate governance attributes which were the focus of this study. 
b. This was a period when most companies globally were recovering from 2007-2008 
financial crises which also affected some of the developing economies like Nigeria. It 
was expected that by this study period (2010-2013), companies would have strengthened 
corporate governance systems to monitor operation and improve disclosure of all 
corporate information in order to boost investments and economic growth. 
 
The periods mentioned in 3.5(a) and 3.5(b) are too very close to the period of this research and it 
could be argued that the recommendations of the King III Report may not have been fully 
implemented and the economies may not have been fully recovered from the global financial 
crisis. However, the results from the study are still useful and could point at whether 
improvements in governance systems are made and how this impacts on disclosure of both 
financial and non-financial information. 
3.6   SAMPLING PROCEDURE 
The study included 584 observations from all non-financial firms with all the required 
information on corporate governance and corporate disclosure from selected securities exchanges 
in Sub-Saharan Africa that is, from South Africa, East Africa and Nigeria. They include: 380 
observations from 95 companies listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange in South Africa, 
100 observations from 25 companies listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange in West Africa and 
75 
 
104 observations from 26 companies listed on the Nairobi and Uganda Securities Exchanges in 
East Africa. Financial firms such as banks and insurance companies were excluded from the 
study because they are specialised in nature with a tighter regulatory environment and are 
normally subjected to different disclosure requirements and accounting principles (Abdifatah, 
2013:659). The sample also excluded firms whose corporate governance data and information on 
corporate disclosure could not be obtained from the company websites, corporate governance 
reports and annual reports for the full period of the study. 
To avoid non-homogeneity caused by the inclusion of companies in the sample with varied 
financial reporting dates, the study excluded from the sample all companies with different 
reporting dates and only included firms whose financial year end was 31
st
 December. 
3. 7    SOURCES OF DATA, DATA COLLECTION METHODS AND MEASUREMENT 
 OF VARIABLES 
Data was collected from company annual reports and corporate governance reports available at 
the Johannesburg Securities Exchanges in South Africa, Nairobi and Uganda Securities 
Exchanges in East Africa and Nigeria Securities Exchange in Nigeria. Most annual reports of 
companies listed on the selected securities exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa are available from 
the BFA McGregor and Bloomberg Databases at the University of Cape Town main library. 
These databases were the major sources of data for this study.  Different methods were used to 
measure and collect data on corporate governance attributes, corporate disclosure and control 
variables as described in sections 3.7.1 to 3.7.3. 
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3.7.1  Measurement  of  corporate governance attributes and control variables 
For corporate governance attributes and control variables, data was extracted from annual reports 
on CEO non-duality, board size, and board composition, composition of audit committees, 
ownership structure (Block share ownership and director ownership), firm size, leverage and 
profitability. Based on existing studies by Ali-Janadi et al. (2013:29); Nandi and Ghosh 
(2012:52); Rouf (2011:7840) and Barako et al. (2006:118), measurements of variables were 
carried out as per the information summarised in the table 3.1 
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Table 3. 1:  Measurements of corporate governance attributes and control variables 
Independent variable Measurement 
CEO non-duality Dichotomous:  1 indicating separation of roles of 
CEO and Board chairman and 0 otherwise. 
Board size Total number of directors on the board. 
Board composition Ratio of non-executive directors to total number of 
directors on the board. 
Composition of audit committee Ratio of non-executive directors to total number of 
directors on the audit committee. 
Concentrated ( Block) share 
ownership  
Percentage of shares held by shareholders with at 
least 5% of the total company shareholdings (Ntim 
et al., 2012:130).  
Director ownership Proportion of shares held by directors (Nazli, 
2007:259). 
Firm size Natural logarithm of total assets 
Leverage Debt ratio defined as a ratio of total debt to total 
assets (Kowalewski et al, 2009:58). 
Profitability Profitability is measured by return on assets 
computed as the ratio of earnings before interest 
and tax   to total assets. This is in line with 
Cespedes  et al. (2010:250); Magri (2010:450) and 
Chakraborty  (2010:308).  
 
From table 3.1, it is indicated that the study used natural logarithm of total assets to measure firm 
size. Use of natural logarithm is based on prior research studies by Garcia-Romos and Garcia-
Olalla (2011:226); Milad et al. (2013:440); Soliman and Ragab (2013:10); Haslindar and Fazilah 
(2011:1800); and Arosa et al. (2010:92) who used natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
to measure firm size.   
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According to, Nadja et al. (2011:694), logarithm of book values of assets is used to account for 
differences in firm size. The use of logarithm also helps to transform data by correcting positive 
skewness thus, enhancing normality (Darnall et al., 2010:1080 and Kyung eta al., 2010:75). 
Consideration of logarithmic data is a widespread practise used in statistical data analysis to 
reduce extreme values of skewness and kurtosis to transform data to look like a normal 
distribution (Eling, 2012:242). The above analysis therefore explains why logarithm of total 
assets is used to measure firm size to ensure that the data conforms to the requirements of a 
normal distribution.  
3.7.2  Measurement and  data collection for corporate disclosure 
For corporate disclosure, a self-constructed disclosure index was developed to measure the level 
of disclosure. The index included 20 selected items on financial information and 40 items on 
non-financial information which all listed companies are supposed to disclose in their annual 
reports. Financial information covered items on general financial information, financial review 
and future financial forecasts (projections). Non-financial information included items on 
corporate background and strategy, governance and corporate social responsibility. Selection of 
items to include in a disclosure index is supported by Elsayed and Hoque (2010:32) who stress 
that the existing literature on disclosure does not provide a number of alternatives for measuring 
corporate disclosure other than use of the disclosure index. Furthermore, Barako et al. 
(2006:120) assert that there is no general theory that provides guidance on selection of items to 
measure the level of corporate disclosure because disclosure by its nature is an abstract construct 




Developing a corporate disclosure index for this study is also supported by prior studies carried 
out by Tatiana, Georgios, Ioannis., and Konstantinos et al. (2013:6); Omaima (2009:89); 
Akhtaruddin (2009:18); Chavent et al. (2006:186); Hossain (2008:665); Nandi and Ghosh 
(2012:51) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:421) who all used self-constructed disclosure index  
to measure the level of corporate disclosure. To minimise subjectivity in selection of items, the 
disclosure index constructed was given to three selected professional experts; that is, two 
professional accountants and one academic Associate Professor of financial economics. They all 
read and edited the disclosure index that I had originally developed and later we remained with 
60 items in the final disclosure index. 
3.7.3  Estimating and scoring the disclosure index 
The disclosure index was estimated by scoring disclosure items in the company annual reports. 
According to Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:6), researchers can use two methods for scoring disclosure 
items in the disclosure index used to determine the level of corporate disclosure.  That is, use of 
weighted and un-weighted approaches. The weighted approach puts emphasis on the relative 
importance of the different disclosed items to the users of annual company reports while the un-
weighted disclosure index assumes that each item disclosed is equally important (Nandi and 
Ghosh, 2012:51). According to Barakat et al. (2015:690), with the un-weighted approach of 
scoring the disclosure items, attention is given to all users of company reports rather than a 
specific particular user group and therefore all the items disclosed have equal importance.  
 
Various research scholars such as Elsayed and Hoque (2010:24); Chavent et al. (2006:186); 
Tatiana et al. (2013:7); Ioannis et al. (2010:215) and Mohammed and Helimi (2009:255), have 
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indicated that most disclosure studies adopt the un-weighted approach of scoring the disclosure 
index. Furthermore, the use of un-weighted method of scoring items of disclosure index is 
supported by Ntim, Opong and Danbold (2012:129) who assert that there is no rigorously 
developed theoretical framework on which weights could be correctly assigned to disclosure 
items. Therefore, the study adopted the un-weighted approach of scoring disclosure items 
because all items in the disclosure index were regarded to have equal importance. With this 
approach, a dichotomous procedure is used where an item is scored one if it is disclosed and zero 
otherwise. The index is then obtained as a ratio of total disclosure to total possible disclosure. 
3.8  DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
This study used STATA MP Version 13 statistical software for empirical data analysis.  It started 
with obtaining descriptive statistics, normality tests and correlation matrix and then it was  
followed by multiple regression analysis where random effects multiple regression models were 
obtained to determine the impact of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of financial 
and non-financial information. The choice of the random effects model in regression analysis 
was appropriate for this study because of presence of dummy and time invariant variables. This 
is supported by Gujarati and Porter (2009:602) who state that use of random effects model helps 
to include in the analysis relevant explanatory variables that do not change overtime and possibly 
others that do change overtime but have the same value for all cross-sectional units.  The dummy 
variable was CEO non-duality, where the score was 1 for the separation of roles of CEO from 
those of the board chairperson and zero otherwise. The time invariant explanatory variable were 
board size, board composition and composition of the audit committees which may not 
necessarily change from one year to another.  
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3.9 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
The aim of this chapter was to describe the research methodology and approach used to carry out 
the study to achieve the stated objectives. The chapter has described the quantitative approach 
used in the study and the use of panel data in gathering the research evidence. It has also been 
described in this chapter that through the review of theory and existing literature, null and 
alternative hypotheses were formulated to guide the study with a view of collecting the empirical 
evidence to either reject the null hypotheses or accept the alternative. 
 
The chapter also discusses the econometric model used in the study, describing the relationship 
between the dependent, independent and control variables. The model was developed based on 
existing empirical studies and availability of data in the areas covered by this study.  The study 
period and the sample used in the study are also described. The chapter further describes the 
basis of various measures of attributes of corporate governance and control variables. For 
disclosure of corporate information, the chapter describes how an un-weighted disclosure index 
was developed and the use of dichotomous procedure of scoring items included in the disclosure 
index. The chapter ends by describing the processes of data analysis where STATA MP Version 
13 statistical software was used. The choice of Random Effects multiple regression model in this 





The next chapter presents descriptive statistics on both corporate governance attributes and 
corporate disclosure and also describes normality tests. It also describes the correlation analysis 






DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the descriptive statistics used to evaluate the application of corporate 
governance attributes and the level of corporate disclosure. It also discusses the normality tests 
and evaluates data transformation requirements for further data analysis. The chapter further 
discusses the empirical results of correlation analysis obtained to evaluate any significant 
relationship between the corporate governance attributes and corporate disclosure, and to detect 
any adverse effects of multicollinearity that would affect multiple regression analysis. 
4.2  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
To evaluate the application of corporate governance attributes and level of corporate disclosure, 
descriptive statistics were obtained and are presented in tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. 
Table 4. 1: Descriptive statistics for a sample of listed companies in South Africa 
 
Where BS represents total  number of directors on the board ; BC: Proportion of non- executive directors to total number of 
directors on the board; IndBC: Proportion of independent non-executive directors to total number of directors on the board; CAC: 
Proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors on the audit committee; Block: proportion of shares held by 
shareholders with at least 5% of total company shareholding; Director: proportion of shares held by directors; Infirm: Natural 
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logarithm of book value of total assets; Lev: Ratio of total debt to total assets; Prof: Ratio of earnings before interest and tax to 
total assets; Financial: disclosure of financial information; Non-financial: disclosure of non-financial information. 
 
Table 4. 2: Descriptive statistics for a sample of listed companies in East Africa 
 
Description of variables is given in table 4.1 
 
Table 4. 3: Descriptive statistics for a sample of listed companies in Nigeria 
 
Description of variables is given in table 4.1 
 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Independent variables 
In this study, independent variables were board composition (BC), board size (BS), composition 
of audit committee (CAC), block shareholding (Block) and director shareholding (Director). On 
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Board composition, tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 show that the mean ratios of non-executive directors 
to the total number of directors on the board are:  67.5% for South Africa, with the independent 
non-executive directors constituting 50.6% of total number of directors on the board. For East 
Africa and Nigeria, the mean values of non-executive directors to total number of directors are 
79.5% and 73.7% respectively. The 50
th 
(median values) and 75
th 
percentiles are 66.7% and 
77.8% respectively for South Africa, 83.3% and 87.5% for East Africa and 76% and 83.3% for 
Nigeria. These statistics imply that majority of the members of directors on corporate boards are 
non-executive directors and therefore, they are able to independently monitor company 
operations and exert a lot of influence on management to disclose information to corporate 
stakeholders. For board size, the mean values of directors on the board are: 10 for South Africa, 
8 for East Africa and 9 for Nigeria. The 50
th
 (median values) and 75
th
 percentiles of board size 
are: 10 and 11 respectively for South Africa, 8 and 10 respectively for East Africa and 9 and 10 
respectively for Nigeria.  
 
The descriptive figures of board size and board composition are consistent with several other 
studies on governance and corporate disclosure in Africa and around the globe. For instance, a 
study by Ntim et al. (2012:131) on voluntary corporate governance disclosures by Post-
Apartheid South African corporations reported average board size of 9.75. Furthermore, 
Allegrini (2013:202) reported average board size of 9.67 and independent board composition of 
38%. Roshima, Zainuddin and Hasnah (2009:221) reported average board size of 8 and the  ratio 
of non-executive directors to total directors of 63%  while a study carried out by  Akhataruddin 
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et al. (2009:9)  had average values of 38.3% and 7.9  for  independent board composition and 
board size respectively.  
 
The implication of these figures is that having a higher proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board and a large board size help the company to bring on board more experienced and 
independent directors with a lot of expertise. Hence, these directors are able to influence the way 
in which corporations are managed and ensure that all the relevant information is disclosed to all 
corporate stakeholders to guide them in the decision-making process. This argument is consistent 
with the agency theory which suggests that non-executive directors are seen as a mechanism for 
monitoring and controlling the actions of managers and protecting shareholders interests through 
enhanced information disclosures (Wan and Zunaidah, 2010:217). About the composition of 
audit committee, the mean values of non-executive directors to total size of the committee are 
0.995 for South Africa, 0.965 for East Africa and 0.912 for Nigeria. These values are consistent 
with Gosh and Moon (2010:158) who reported a mean value of 0.91 but higher than 0.693 and 
0.701 reported by Akhtaruddin and Hasnah (2010:75) and Nurul and Sherliza (2011:297) 
respectively. 
 
For block shareholding, the study established that the mean percentages of shares held by 
substantial shareholders were 46.5% for South Africa, 57.8% for East Africa and 56.7% for 
Nigeria. The 50
th 
(median values) and 75
th
 percentiles are 46.7% and 62.6% respectively for 
South Africa, 60.5% and 70% respectively for East Africa and 60.6% and 69.2% respectively for 
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Nigeria. These values are consistent with the study by Poh and Grantley (2013:15) who reported 
an average block shareholder ownership of 59.3%, but slightly less than the average value of 
62% reported by Ntim et al. (2012:131) on a sample of South African firms listed on 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange for the period 2002–2006. They are also less than the 73% 
block shareholder ownership reported by Ferreira et al. (2012:290) on a study carried out on 
Portuguese listed companies.  
 
The mean values of director shareholding were 13.1% for South Africa, 5% for East Africa and 
5.1% for Nigeria. The 50
th 
(median values) and 75
th
 percentiles were 2.3% and 21.1% 
respectively for South Africa, 0.025% and 3.2% for East Africa and 1.1% and 6.3% for Nigeria. 
These values are less than 23.4% reported by Mangena and Chamisa (2008:37) who carried out a 
study on corporate governance for firms listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange. Also, 
although the average director shareholding for South Africa is consistent with the study by 
Roshima et al. (2009:10) who reported the average director share ownership of 9.95%, it is far 
less than 29.2% reported by Akhataruddin and Hasnah (2010:76). The average director share 
ownership of East Africa and Nigeria is so low compared to that of South Africa, but consistent 
with a study by Htay et al. (2012:132) who reported an average director  shareholding of 2%.  
 
For CEO non-duality, the data collected was categorical and a nominal scale of measurement 
was used. While 1 was used to represent separation of duties of the chairman board of directors 
from those of the chief executive officer and the positions held by two individuals, 0 was used to 
88 
 
describe a situation where the roles of the chief executive officer and the chairman board of 
directors were combined and the positions held by one person. The description of CEO non-

















































































Figure 3: Description of CEO non-duality for listed firms in Nigeria 
 
From figures 1 and 2, it is clearly observed that the disclosure level of financial, governance and 
CSR (non-financial) information for listed firms in both South Africa and East Africa is higher at 
1 compared to 0. This implies that in companies where the roles of chairperson board of directors 
are separate from those of the CEO, the level of corporate disclosure of both financial and non-
financial information is higher. Even for listed firms in Nigeria, we can observe from figure 3 
that the level of disclosure of financial information is higher at 1 compared to 0. On disclosure of 
governance and CSR (non-financial) information for listed firms in Nigeria, the data points were 
only four at 0 and therefore could not form a bar compared to data points at 1. This implies that 
the most observed values are where the roles of the chief executive officer and chairperson board 
of directors are separate. This means that most listed companies in Nigeria have separated the 
two roles for proper governance of company operations, which leads to increase in the level of 




 In South Africa, the separation of roles is in line with the King III Report (2009:12), which 
recommends separation of roles of chief executive officer  and board chairperson. For Nigeria, 
the Code of Corporate Governance for public companies (Page 12) states that the roles of the two 
officers should be separate. This is consistent with most studies which indicate that most 
companies have separated those roles. Zubaidah, Nurmala and Kamaruzaman (2009:164) 
revealed a CEO non-duality of 0.707 while Olanyika (2010:163) who carried out a study on 
companies listed on Nigeria Securities Exchange, reported CEO non-duality of 0.87.  
4.2.2  Descriptive statistics for dependent variables 
The study established that the mean values of disclosure of financial information were 73.4% for 
South Africa, 56.3 % for East Africa and 59.8% for Nigeria. The 50
th 
(median values) and 75
th
 
percentiles for disclosure of financial information were 75% and 80% respectively for South 
Africa, 55% and 66.7% respectively for East Africa and 60% and 68.4% respectively for Nigeria. 
For non-financial information, the mean values of disclosure were 80% for South Africa, 66.5% 
for East Africa and 67.2% for Nigeria. The 50
th
 (median values) and 75
th
 percentiles for 
disclosure of non-financial information were 82.6% and 87% respectively for South Africa, 
69.6% and 75.6% respectively for East Africa and 65.2% and 78.3% for Nigeria.   
 
 The figures indicate that for both types of information disclosure, South Africa has higher levels 
of disclosure than East Africa and Nigeria. The disclosure levels for East Africa and Nigeria are 
almost the same and consistent with the study carried out by Desoky and Mousa (2012:59) who 
reported the mean corporate disclosure of 58.8% for companies listed on Egyptian Securities 
Exchange in North Africa. The findings are also consistent with studies by Akhtaruddin and 
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Hasnah (2010:75) and Nandi and Ghosh (2012:53) who reported mean disclosure levels of 
58.6% and 62.4% respectively. However the mean corporate disclosure levels from all the listed 
firms under study (South Africa, East Africa and Nigeria) are higher than the average disclosure 
level of 48.8% reported by Bokpin and Zangina (2009:695) who carried out a study on 
companies listed on the Ghana Securities Exchange. 
4.3  TEST FOR NORMALITY  
Assessment of normality is required in most statistical analysis, especially if parametric methods 
are to be used. This is because parametric statistical analysis assumes that data be normally 
distributed (Nornadiah & Yap, 2011:21). There are several tests to determine whether the data of 
the variables is normally distributed. The study used a simple examination of skewness and 
kurtosis. According to Xiong & Idzorek (2011:4), a normally distributed data has a skewness of 
0 and a kurtosis of 3. 
 
 Analysis of skewness and kurtosis of both independent and the control variables given in table 
4.1 for a sample of South African listed firms indicate that data of some variables is not normally 
distributed. For instance, variables such as composition of audit committees, director 
shareholding, profitability and firm size have values of skewness and kurtosis that deviate from 
the assumptions of normal distribution. However, for the dependent variables, the skewness and 
kurtosis of disclosing financial information for South African listed firms was -0.399 and 2.42 
respectively, while disclosing governance and CSR information had skewness and kurtosis 
values of -0.72 and 3.55 respectively which all approximate to a normally distributed data. A 
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graphical representation of normality for dependent variables (disclosure of financial and non-
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Figure 4: Distribution of Disclosure of Financial, Governance and CSR (non-financial) information for a sample of South 
African listed firms. 
 
Figure 4 indicates that data on disclosure of both financial and non-financial information, which 
are the dependent variables in the study, is approximately normally distributed. 
 
For East Africa, table 4.2 shows that the independent variables - board composition, composition 
of audit committee, block shareholding and director shareholding - had high values of skewness 
and kurtosis. The data from these variables was therefore not normally distributed. Only one 
independent variable, that is, board size, had values of skewness and kurtosis that follow the 
assumptions of a normal distribution. For control variables, while profitability which had a 
slightly high value of kurtosis (4.104), the rest (leverage and firm size) had values of skewness 




The values of skewness and kurtosis for dependent variables (disclosure of financial and non-
financial information) were in the range of normal distribution, which is 0.135 and 2.096 for 
skewness and kurtosis respectively for disclosure of financial information and -0.45 and 2.67 for 
skewness and kurtosis respectively for disclosing non-information. Data on dependent variables 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Disclosure of Financial, Governance and CSR (non-financial) information for a sample of listed firm in 
East Africa. 
 
Figure 5 shows that data on both disclosure of financial information and non-financial 
information, which are the dependent variables in the study, is normally distributed. 
 
For listed firms in Nigeria, the values of skewness of the independent variables, that is, 
composition of audit committees and block shareholding shown in table 4.3 were -1.20 and -0.93 
respectively. These values are slightly less than 0, which is recommended for a normally 
distributed data. Director shareholding which is one of the independent variables had higher 
values of skewness and kurtosis, that is: 2.78 and 10.41 respectively, which violates the 
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assumptions of normality. Control variables (profitability and firm size) also had high values of 
skewness and kurtosis, that is: 0.98 and 6.13 respectively for profitability and -1.67 and 7.22 
respectively for firm size. For dependent variables (disclosure of financial and non-financial 
information), the values of skewness and kurtosis shown in table 4.3 were in the ranges required 
for a normal distribution. Also, a graphical representation of data of listed firms in Nigeria for 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Disclosure of Financial, Governance and CSR (non-financial) information for a sample of listed firms 
in Nigeria 
 
Figure 6 indicates that data on disclosure of financial and non-financial information which are 
the dependent variables in the study is normally distributed. 
4.4  TEST FOR LINEARITY  
The primary objective of this study was to examine whether there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and disclosure of corporate information by listed companies in developing 
economies. To achieve this, a correlation analysis was carried out. The primary objective of 
correlation analysis is to measure the strength or the degree of linear association between two 
variables (Gujarati, 2003:23). The correlation coefficient is used to measure this strength of 
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linear association. To carry out correlation analysis for this study, a decision had to be made on 
whether to use Pearson or Spearman rank correlations. 
 
Pearson correlation is regarded as one of the most commonly used methods of statistical 
analysis, but its value may be seriously affected by one outlier (Croux & Dehon, 2010:498). In 
statistical analysis, Pearson correlation estimator is the most efficient for normal distributions, 
but the statistical efficiency of the Spearman correlation estimator remains above 70% for all 
possible values of the population correlation. Spearman rank correlation coefficient is therefore 
frequently used as a non-parametric measure of the degree of association between variables. It is 
used to measure correlation between two variables where the assumption of a normally 
distributed data is not realistic (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002:702). Furthermore, it is reported 
that where normality tests are done and some variables are distinctively non-normal, then non-
parametric tests such as Spearman’s rank order correlations are used (Rosalind & Woodcock, 
2011:114).  
 
 Although, both Pearson  and Spearman rank correlations are used to measure the strength of 
linear dependence between two variables, the later is less sensitive to outliers than the former 
(Azam, Hoque and Yeasmin, 2010:205). This implies that where data is not normally distributed, 
and can also be arranged in ranks or follows the ordinal scales, then Spearman rank correlation is 
commonly used as an alternative to Pearson correlation to measure the strength of the linear 
association between variables. From the tests of normality given in section 4.3 of this study, it is 
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clear that data of some variables is not normally distributed. Therefore, this study used Spearman 
rank correlation analysis to measure the linear association between the variables and the results 
are presented and discussed from sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. 
 
4.4.1  Correlation analysis for listed firms in South Africa. 
The correlation analysis of independent, control and dependent variables for South African listed 














Table 4. 4: Spearman correlation for listed firms in South Africa 
Govern describes disclosure of non-financial information, description of other variables is given in table 4.1 
 
From table 4.4, the correlation coefficients between the corporate governance attributes and 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information, are generally weak. On the analysis 
between independent and dependent variables, it is observed that the relationship between board 
size and disclosure of both financial and non-financial information is positive and significant (r = 
0.2009 for disclosure of financial information and r = 0.1208 for disclosure of non-financial 
information). This implies that when board size increases, the level of corporate disclosure also 
increases.  This is consistent with Barakat et al. (2015:687) that a large board could increase 





About board composition, the correlation between board composition and disclosure of non-
financial information is positive and significant (r = 0.1038) at 5% level. This implies that when 
the proportion of non-executive directors on the board increases, disclosure of non-financial 
information such as information on CSR and governance also increases. In addition, empirical 
results show that the relationship between independent board composition and disclosure of both 
financial and non-financial information is weak and not significant. For audit committees, it was 
established that the composition of the committee (having a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors on the audit committee), has a positive effect on corporate disclosure, though the 
relationship is not significant.  
 
Results from table 4.4 shows that: block and director ownership of shares have a negative 
association with corporate disclosure. Although the correlation between block shareholding and 
corporate disclosure is insignificant, the correlation between director shareholding and corporate 
disclosure is significant. These findings show that when the number of shares held by few 
individuals or directors increases, disclosure of corporate information reduces. This is because in 
such companies, information can easily be accessed by the block shareholders or directors who 
hold majority shares and therefore, there is no motivation for disclosing such information to 
other stakeholders. The results are consistent with empirical findings by Donnelly and Mulcahy 
(2008:422) who established that the correlation between managerial ownership of shares and 




A correlation analysis between control variables and corporate disclosure show that the 
relationship between all the three control variables (leverage, profitability and firm size) and 
disclosure of both financial and non-financial information is positive. Although the effect of both 
profitability and firm size on corporate disclosure is significant, the effect of leverage is 
significant in disclosure of non-financial information but insignificant in disclosure of financial 
information. The implication of this is that as both company levels of profitability, leverage and 
firm size increase, disclosure of corporate information also increases. 
4.4.2  Correlation analysis for listed firms in East Africa. 
The correlation analysis of variables under study for listed firms in East Africa is presented in the 
table 4.5. 
Table  4.5  Spearman correlation for listed firms in East Africa 




Results from table 4.5 show that the correlation between board size and disclosure of both 
financial and non-financial information is positive and significant (r = 0.1712 for disclosure of 
financial information and r = 0.4254 for disclosure of non-financial information). This means 
that when board size increases, disclosure of both financial and non-financial information also 
increases. Results also show that the correlation between board composition and disclosure of 
non-financial information is positive and significant (r = 0.2274). This implies that when the 
proportion of non-executive directors on corporate boards increase, disclosure of non-financial 
information such as governance and CSR information also increases. 
 
 The findings are supported by Sartawi, Hindawi, Bsoul and Ali (2014:69), who assert that the 
presence of a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board could control agency 
conflicts and reduce information asymmetry by demanding for increase in disclosure of 
corporate information. However, results in table 4.5 further show that the relationship between 
board composition and disclosure of financial information is positive but not significant. 
  
On composition of audit committees, the results in table 4.5 show that the association between 
audit committee composition and corporate disclosure is positive, but not significant. The 
findings also show that the relationship between block and director ownership of shares and 
corporate disclosure is not significant. On the association between control variables and 
corporate disclosure, the study established that all the three control variables (leverage, 
profitability and firm size) are positively associated with the level of corporate disclosure.  
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4.4.3  Correlation analysis for listed firms in Nigeria. 
The analysis of the degree of association between the variables for Nigerian listed firms is 
presented in the table 4.6. 
Table 4. 6 Spearman correlation for listed firms in Nigeria 
Where: Govern represents disclosure of non-financial information, description of other variables is given in table 4.1 
 
The correlation analysis from table 4.6 shows that the association between board size and 
disclosure of non-financial information is positive and significant (r = 0.214). This implies that 
when board size increases, disclosure of corporate information also increases. The results are 
consistent with the argument by Zubaidah, Nurmala and Kamaruzaman (2009:157) that larger 
board size means that there are more ideas and skills that can be shared among board members. 
These ideas are likely to lead to improvement in the way the company discloses its information, 
resulting in a positive association between board size and corporate disclosure.  
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Furthermore, the study established that board composition has a negative and significant 
association with disclosure of financial information (r = -0.1861). However, its association with 
disclosure of non-financial information is also negative but not significant. The findings are 
consistent with Elinda and Nazli (2012:301) that non-financial information activities such as 
CSR activities are not necessarily the primary concern of non-executive directors hence, 
explaining why the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors on corporate 
boards and disclosure of information on CSR may not necessarily be statistically significant. For 
audit committee, the study revealed that having a higher proportion of non-executive directors on 
the audit committee is negative and significantly associated with disclosure of non-financial 
information (r = -0.206). The argument could also be that disclosure of information is not a 
primary concern of the audit committees. However, the correlation between a higher proportion 
of executive directors on the audit committee and disclosure of financial information is weak, 
positive (r = 0.0538) and not significant. 
 
On block and director share ownership, the study established that block shareholding has a 
positive and significant association with disclosure of financial information (r = 0.1998) but its 
relationship with the level of disclosure of non-financial information is not significant. Results in 
table 4.6 further show that the association between director shareholding and disclosure of non-
financial information is negative and significant at 5% level (r = -0.248). The results are 
supported by Nazli (2007:255) that companies where directors hold a substantial number of 
shares, public accountability may be less because of minimal outsiders’ interests. However, the 
study also established that the correlation between director ownership of shares and disclosure of 
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financial information is not significant. For control variables (firm size, profitability and 
leverage), it was established that firm size and profitability are positively associated with 
corporate disclosure while the correlation between leverage and disclosure of non-financial 
information is negative but not significant. 
4.5  USING CORRELATION ANALYSIS TO DETECT MULTICOLLINEARITY 
Multicolinearity occurs when the explanatory variables in a regression equation are correlated 
with one another thus having a similar piece of information about the dependent variable. Highly 
correlated independent variables are likely to cause adverse effects of multicollinearity on the 
regression estimation procedure (Aczel & Sounderpandian, 2002:568). Multicollinearity is a 
question of degree and not of kind, implying that in regression analysis, the issue is not about the 
presence or absence of multicollinearity but various degrees of its occurrence (Gujarati, 2003: 
359). Although there are various methods of detecting multicollinearity, Aczel & 
Sounderpandian (2002:570) state that the first method is computation of a correlation matrix 
which helps in identifying the explanatory variables that are highly correlated with one another 
thus causing the problem of multicollinearity when included together in the regression equation. 
Similarly, Gwowen (2010:488) contends that multicollinearity can be detected through the use of 
simple correlation analysis and variance inflation factor. The suggested rule of thumb that 
describes the existence of a serious multicollinearity problem is when the pair-wise correlation 
coefficient between two predictor variables  is in excess of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2003:359).  
 
From the correlation matrix of South African listed companies in table 4.4 above, it is observed 
that the correlation coefficients between predictor variables are generally low. The higher values 
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of correlation coefficients are: 0.571 for the association between firm size and board size, 0.3597 
between firm size and board composition and 0.4831 between board composition and 
independent board composition. These are not strong enough to cause multicollinearity problems 
in regression analysis. For listed firms in  East Africa, the correlation matrix given in table 4.5 
shows that the highest correlation coefficients are 0.4759 for the association between firm size 
and board size and 0.4039  between board size and board composition. The correlation matrix of 
Nigerian listed firms given in table 4.6 gives the highest correlation coefficients as 0.5823 
between firm size and board size and 0.4775 between the composition of audit committee and 
board composition. All these correlation coefficients reported for listed firms in East Africa and 
Nigeria are also strong enough to cause multicollinearity problems in regression analysis. 
4.6  SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
One of the objectives of this study was to evaluate corporate governance attributes applicable for 
disclosure of corporate information by listed companies in developing economies. To achieve 
this, in this chapter, descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and percentile values) 
were generated and discussed with existing findings and literature in both developed and 
developing economies. The study established that board size of the companies was fairly large 
with mean values above 5 as recommended by Damagum and Chima (2013:4). The proportions 
of non-executive directors on corporate boards and audit committees were also higher with mean 
values above 0.5. In addition, the study further established that roles of CEO are separate from 
those of board chairpersons. These findings are consistent with the agency theory and reveal that 
there is a fair application of governance attributes which could influence the monitoring and 
operations of companies and hence lead to enhanced information disclosure. 
105 
 
For block ownership of shares, it was established that except for listed companies in South 
Africa, where the mean value was less than 0.5, the mean values for listed companies in Nigeria 
and East Africa were slightly above 0.5 that is 0.567 and 0.578 respectively. The proportion of 
director share ownership to total shareholding was low for all the listed firms in South Africa, 
East Africa and Nigeria, with mean values of less than 0.5. These results indicate that both block 
and director ownership may not exert influence on disclosure of corporate information since the 
proportion of their shareholdings is generally low. On the other hand, results in this chapter show 
that the levels of disclosure of both financial and non-financial information are generally high for 
listed firms in South Africa but slightly above the mean value of 0.5 in East Africa and Nigeria. 
This could possibly imply that the corporate governance attributes are more effective in 
enhancing corporate disclosure for companies listed in South Africa than those listed in East 
Africa and Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, the chapter presented and discussed normality tests which were obtained through 
examination of skewness and kurtosis of the variables.  It was established that although data for 
some corporate governance attributes was not normally distributed, data for corporate disclosure 
was approximately normally distributed and therefore did not require any transformation for 
further analysis. The Spearman rank correlation analysis was carried out and established that 
most corporate governance attributes had a significant association with corporate disclosure and 
hence able to impact on how companies disclose financial and non-financial information. The 
correlation analysis further established that the correlation coefficients were generally low and 
therefore the effects of multicollinearity in regression models were minimized. 
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The next chapter presents the results of multiple regression analysis and interpretation of 
findings about disclosure of financial information. It presents a comparative analysis of corporate 
governance attributes with a significant effect on disclosure of financial information for listed 











ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS ON EFFECT OF CORPORATE 
GOVENANCE ON DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the interpretation and discussion of empirical tests and results of the study 
obtained using random effects multiple regression analysis of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance attributes on disclosure of financial information by listed companies. A comparative 
analysis was carried out for selected stock markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, that is, listed 
companies in South Africa, Nigeria and East Africa. The analysis in this chapter was carried out 
to obtain findings on research question ii given in section 1.3 of chapter one about examining the 
effect of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of financial information by listed 
companies in developing economies. The chapter starts with interpretation of results from full 
regression models predicting the impact of all corporate governance attributes and control 
variables on disclosure of corporate information, followed by results of the best regression 
models obtained through the model reduction process where the best explanatory variables were 
carefully selected.  
5.2 EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES ON DISCLOSURE 
OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
 







Table 5. 1:  Full model of Multiple Regression analysis (One-tailed test) for disclosure of financial 
information for listed firms in South Africa  
 
One-tailed test, where  Financial represents: disclosure of financial information; CEO non duality: dummy variable indicating 
separation of roles of CEO and the chairperson of board of directors coded one, otherwise zero; Board size: Total number of 
directors on the board; Board composition: proportion of non executive directors to total number of directors on the board; 
Independent board composition: Proportion of independent non executive directors to total number of directors on the board; 
Composition of audit committee: propotion of non executive directors to total number of directors on the audit committee; Block 
ownership: proportion of shares held by shareholders with atleast 5% of total company shareholding; Director ownership: 
proportion of shares held by directors; Firm size: Book value of total assets; Leverage: Ratio of total debt to total assets; 




Table 5. 2: Full model of Multiple Regression analysis (One-tailed test) on disclosure of financial 
information for data from listed firms in Nigeria 
 
One-tailed test, where: Financial: disclosure of financial information; CEO non duality: dummy variable indicating separation of 
roles of CEO and the chairperson of board of directors coded one, otherwise zero; Board size: Total number of directors on the 
board; Board composition: proportion of non executive directors to total number of directors on the board; Composition of audit 
committee: propotion of non executive directors to total number of directors on the audit committee; Block ownership: 
proportion of shares held by shareholders with atleast 5% of total company shareholding; Director ownership: proportion of 
shares held by directors; Firm size: Book value of total assets; Leverage: Ratio of total debt to total assets; Profitability: Ratio of 





Table 5. 3: Full Regression model (One-tailed test) for disclosure of financial information from listed 
firms in East Africa 
 
One-tailed test, where:  Financial represents: disclosure of financial information; other variables are arleady described in table 5.1 
 
The panel data analysis was carried out using data for a period of four years from 2010 to 2013. 
The year 2010 is not indicated in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 because it was used as a reference point 
(base year) during analysis. Results in table 5.1 show that for listed firms in South Africa, there 
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was a statistically significant reduction in the mean value of disclosure of financial information 
by 3.82%  from 2010 to 2012  (p value = 0.002). The average values of disclosure of financial 
information in 2011 and 2013 were not  statistically significantly different from the value of 
2010  as indicated by the p value =0.192 and p value = 0.161 respectively. The regression model 
is statistically significant LR test (d.f.=7)= 35.06 and p value =0.0008. For listed firms in 
Nigeria, results in table 5.2 show that the regression model is generally weak with a level of 
statistical significance slightly above 10% (p value = 0.1171). Results from the model show that 
the mean value of disclosure of financial information  reduced by 3.52%  in 2011, 2.26%  in 
2012 and 3.37%  in 2013 from the value of the year 2010. However, these changes were  not 
statistically siginicantly different from the mean value of 2010. For East Africa, regression 
model is not statistically significant (p value = 0.2432) and therefore, there is no sufficient 
evidence to examine the influence of the variables given in the model on disclosure of financial 
information. A comparative analysis and interpretation of  significant results of regression 
analysis is presented from section 5.2.1 to 5.2.6. 
5.2.1  Effect of CEO non-duality on disclosure of financial information 
Results from tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show that CEO non-duality has a positive and statistically 
significant influence on disclosure of financial information for listed companies in South Africa 
and Nigeria. However, results for listed firms in East Africa are not statistically significant. For 
South Africa, The coefficient of CEO non-duality is positive (β = 0.1257) and statistically 
significant at 1% level (P value = 0.002). This implies that on average, when company roles of  
the chief executive officer are separate from those of the chairperson of the board of directors, 
the  level of disclosure of financial information increases by 12.57%. This is because separation 
of roles of the chairperson of the board of directors from those of the  chief executive officer give 
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the former independent powers to effectively monitor the operations of the company and  ensure 
that corporate financial information is disclosed to all the stakeholders.  Similarly, for listed 
firms in Nigeria, the coefficient of CEO non-duality is positive (β = 0.1082), and statistically 
significant at 5% level( P value = 0.0235).  
 
Based on  these findings, the null hypothesis 3.3.1a is rejected. The findings are consistent with 
emprical evidence by  Rouf (2010:7847) from the Dhaka Stock Exchange in Bangladesh, 
Olanyika (2010:165) from Nigeria Stock Exchange, Adelopo (2011:342) on voluntary disclosure 
practices amongst listed companies in Nigeria and Cormier et al. (2010:583) on corporate 
governance and information asymmetry for Canadian firms cross-listed in USA.  They all 
established that separation of roles of CEO from those of the board chairperson has a statistical  
significant influence on  performance and disclosure of corporate information. Olanyike 
(2010:158) further asserts that separation of duties leads to  avoidance of CEO entrenchment in 
company operations, increased effectiveness in board monitoring and establishment of 
independence between the board of directors and corporate management.  
 
The findings are also consistent with Htay (2012:120) who assert that the independence of the 
board attained by separating leadership roles will put pressure on management led by the CEO in 
disclosing corporate information. They are further supported by Soliman and Ragab, (2013:5)  
who state that to make the board of directors more independent and effective in monitoring 
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company operations, the chairman of the board should not be the same person acting as the 
company CEO.  
 
Furthermore, separation of duties between the company chairperson and chief executive officer 
is also currently a requirement for all companies listed on Johannesburg Securities Exchange in 
South Africa as recommended by the King III Report (2009:12).  It is also argued that since one 
of the board’s most important roles is to oversee performance of corporate top management, 
allowing the CEO to also serve as chairperson of the board of directors compromises the desired 
system of checks and balances and clearly represents a conflict of interest (Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2008:799). Hence, a need to ensure that the roles of the two officers are separate. 
5.2.2  Effect of board size on disclosure of financial information  
The results of the regression analysis from table 5.1, shows that for listed firms in South Africa, 
board size has a positive significant  influence on disclosure of financial information at 5% level 
(β = 0.0054, P value = 0.0245). The findings  imply that increase in board size leads to a 
significant increase in the level of disclosure of financial information, hence the null  hypothesis 
3.3.2a is rejected.  However, results from tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that for listed firms in Nigeria 
and East Africa, the influence of board size on financial disclosure is not statistically significant. 
For South Africa, results are consistent with findings by Allegrin (2011:206) and Htay et al. 
(2012:204) which revealed that companies with large size of board of directors disclose more 
financial information than companies with small boards. In addition, a study by Kent and Stewart 
(2008:666) on corporate governance and disclosure established that board size has a positive 
significant  influence on corporate disclosure.    
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Furthermore, consistent with the findings, empirical results by Akhtarudin et al (2009: 13) who 
carried out a study on corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports 
of Malaysian listed firms, show that increase in board size had a positive statistical significant 
influence on corporate disclosure at 1% level. The argument for this is that  the size of the board 
is believed to bring to the company different people with varied skills which positively affect the 
ablility of the board to evaluate corporate managerial performance. Hence, large board size 
increases the collective experience and expertise for corporate boards, which ulitimately leads to 
faster information processing and disclosure (Akhtarudin et al, 2009: 4). 
5.2.3 Effect of block ownership of shares  on disclosure of financial information. 
Emprical findings  in tables 5.1 and 5.2, show that the effect of block ownership of shares  on 
discosure of financial information is negative and  significant for listed firms in South Africa (p 
value = 0.054) and postive and significant for listed firms in Nigeria (p value = 0.091). However, 
the findings in table 5.3 reveal that block ownership of shares has no siginficant effect on 
disclosure of financial information for listed firms in East Africa.  For results from listed firms in 
South Africa, the coefficient( β = -0.0517) shows a negative influence on disclosure of financial 
information. This implies that a unit percentage increase in block share ownership results in a 
5.17% decrease in disclosure of financial information. The implication of these findings is that 
where there are few individuals with majority shareholding, disclosure of financial information is 
low compared to companies where shareholding is widely spread. The argument for this is that 
firms with block  share ownership tend to disclose less information because  shareholders can 




On the other hand, in corporations where ownership of shares is widely spread, disclosure of 
information tends to be higher. In such corporations, increased disclosure is because of the 
potential conflicts between the principals and agents, which are higher for companies whose 
share ownership is more widely spread than in more closely held companies or companies with 
block or concentrated share ownership (Kanga and Gray, 2011:406). This is in line with the 
agency theory, which supports increased disclosure of corporate information in order to avoid 
conflicts between shareholders and corporate managers.  However, empirical results from 
Nigeria contradict this assertion and instead show that block shareownership leads to increase in 
disclosure of listed companies  
 
 The findings of this study for listed firms in South Africa,  are consistent with a study by Barako 
(2007:124) on listed companies in Kenya (East Africa) which established that block share 
ownership (Ownership concentration) has a negative influence on disclosure of financial 
information. In addition, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:20) and Ezat and El-Masry (2008:853) assert 
that companies whose shareholding is widely spread disclose more financial information than 
those with block ownership of shares.  However, emprical results by Chakib (2012:60) from 
Tunisian listed companies in North Africa show that ownership structure has no influence on 
corporate disclosure. The argument given for this was that almost 80% of Tunisian listed 
companies are small and medium enterprises which lack enough financial and human resources 




5.2.4  Effect of director  ownership of shares  on disclosure of financial information. 
For listed firms in South Africa, empirical results from table 5.1 show that director ownership of 
shares has a negative statistical significant effect on disclosure of financial information at 10% 
level (P value = 0.051). However, the coefficient (β = – 0.0662) indicates a negative effect, 
which  implies that holding other explanatory variables constant, a unit percentage increase in 
director ownership of shares results in 6.62% decrease in disclosure of financial information. The 
implication of this is that in companies where directors own more shares, they tend to hold 
financial information to themselves so that they can benefit from it instead of disclosing it to 
other stakeholders. For listed firms in Nigeria and East Africa, findings in tables 5.2 and 5.3 did 
not establish any significant effect. Hence, there is no sufficient evidence to conclude that 
director ownership of shares significantly influence disclosure of financial information. 
 
 The findings from listed firms in South Africa are supported by Htay et al. (2012:200) who 
argue that directors who have substantial amounts of ownership might not want to disclose 
information to outsiders because they can use their discretionary powers to spend company 
resources in a way that serves their own interests  and at the expense of other shareholders. The 
negative significant influence  of director ownership on corporate disclosure is also consistent 
with findings of the study by Nazli (2007:260) on Malaysian firms,  which established that 
companies in which the executive and non-independent directors hold a higher proportion of 
shares, disclose less information in their annual reports. However, the results are inconsistent 
with findings by Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008:423) and Roshima et al (2009:226), which did not 
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establish any siginicant relationship between managerial (executive director) share ownership 
and corporate disclosure. 
5.2.5 Effect of board composition on disclosure of financial information 
Results in table 5.2 show that for listed firms in Nigeria, board composition has a  moderate 
negative significant effect on disclosure of financial information at 10% level, (β = -0.1655, p-
value = 0.08). The implication of this is that companies with a higher proportion of non-
executive directors on the board disclose less information. The results contradict the agency 
theory  which encourages companies to have a higher percentage of non-exective directors on the 
board to enhance monitoring of company operations, reduce agency conficts and enhance 
corporate disclosure. Findings in tables 5.1 and 5.3 show that for listed firms in South Africa and 
East Africa, the influence of board composition on disclosure of financial information is not 
statistically significant. 
5.2.6  Effect of  control variables on disclosure of financial information 
In this study, control variables include profitability, firm size and leverage. The findings in table 
5.1 reveal that  for listed firms in South Africa, profitability has a positive significant  influence 
on the disclosure of financial information (P value = 0.0405) at 5% level. However, the findings 
in tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that for listed firms in Nigeria and East Africa, the effect of 
profitability on disclosure of financial information is not significant. The findings also show that 
for listed firms in South Africa, leverage has a moderate positive significant effect on the 
disclosure of financial information (β = 0.0503, p-value = 0.093). This implies that in companies 
where the ratio of total debt to total assets is high, lenders enhance activities that deal with the 
monitoring of company operations, thus demanding for an increase in disclosure of corporate 
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information. The results are consistent with findings by Laivi (2009:31) who established that 
leverage has a positive influence on disclosure quality. They are also supported by Desoky and 
Mousa (2012:55), who assert that corporate management normally increases disclosure of 
financial information for monitoring purposes and to assure lenders about the company’s ability 
to meet its obligations.  
 
Empirical results from listed firms in South Africa indicate that a unit percentage increase in the 
level of company profitability results into a 10.05%  increase in the level of disclosure of 
financial information. The implications of the findings are that companies that  consistently make 
profits will be  motivated to disclose financial information so as to attract new investors. The 
managers of such companies are also motivated to work harder and negotiate for higher 
remuneration packages. The research  findings  obtained from listed firms in South Africa are 
consistent with empirical results by Barros (2013:571), who established that profitability has a 
positive significant influence on corporate disclosure. They are also supported by Ferreira et al. 
(2012:283) who state that profitable firms have incentives for corporate disclosure in order to 
screen themselves from  less profitable firms. Furthermore, according to Isabel et al. (2011:482), 
when high profitability levels are achieved, companies are motivated to disclose more 
information so as to stand out from other less successful firms, acquire funds from the investors 




About firm size, the results in tables 5.2 and 5.3 show that it  has a positive statistical significant 
influence on disclosure of financial information for listed firms in Nigeria and East Africa.  
However, results from listed firms in South Africa shown in 5.1 established that firm size has no 
significant effect on disclosure of financial information. For listed firms in Nigeria, the 
coefficient  β = 0.01618 with  p value = 0.029,  which implies that on average, a unit per cent 
increase in firm size leads to a 1.62% increase in disclosure of financial information. 
Furthermore, for listed firms in East Africa, the coefficient β = 0.02409 with p value = 0.0045 
implies that on average, a unit per cent increase in firm size leads to a 2.41% increase in 
disclosure of financial information.  The findings are consistent with empirical results by Desoky 
and Mousa (2012:66) from the Egyptian exchange; Allegrini and Greco (2013:206) from Italian 
listed companies and Kabiri (2014:330) from public listed companies in Nigeria, who established 
that firm size has a statistical significant influence on financial transparency and disclosure.  
The results are also supported by Frily & Mekel (2014:1541) who assert that large companies 
disclose more information to reduce agency costs and Isabel et al. (2010:481) who argue that 
large companies suffer from conflicts of interest between shareholders, debt holders and 
managers and as such, disclosure of financial information is used as one of the ways to reduce 
information asymmetries.  
The results in tables 5.2 and 5.3 shows that for listed firms in Nigeria and East Africa, the effect 




After  regression analysis using full models, further analysis was carried out where best 
regression models were obtained through the model reduction process. This was done by 
eliminating variables that were not significant  to remain with significant variables in the model. 
Results from this analysis are presented in tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. 
Table 5. 4: Best regression model (one-tailed test) for disclosure of financial information for listed firms 
in South Africa 
 
One-tailed test, where Financial represents: disclosure of financial information; CEO non duality: dummy variable indicating 
separation of roles of CEO and the chairperson of board of directors coded one, otherwise zero; Board size: Total number of 




Table 5.5: Best Regression model (one-tailed test) for disclosure of financial information from listed 
firms in Nigeria 
 
One-tailed test, Where: Financial represents disclosure of financial information; CEO non-duality: dummy variable indicating 
separation of roles of CEO and the chairperson of board of directors coded one, otherwise zero; Block ownership: proportion of 











Table 5. 6: Best regression model (0ne-tailed test) for disclosure of financial information from 
listed firms in East Africa 
 
One-tailed test, where:  Financial represents disclosure of financial information; Firm size: Book value of total assets.  
 
Like full model regression analysis given in tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3,  the panel data analysis for 
the best regression models  was carried out using data for a period of four years from 2010 to 
2013. The year 2010 is not indicated in tables of analysis  because it was used as a reference 
point (base year). All the best models were statistically significant, that is: LR test (d.f.=7) = 
29.94 , p value =0.0001 for listed firms in South Africa shown in table 5.4; LR test (d.f.=5) = 
9.03, p value = 0.1018 for listed firms in Nigeria shown in table 5.5 and LR test (d.f = 4) = 
10.83, p value = 0.0285 for listed firms in East Africa shown in table 5.6 . The significance of 
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these models implies that there was sufficient evidence to predict the effect of the variables given 
in the models on disclosure of financial information. All the significant variables shown in the 
best models of panel data regression analysis  have been discussed in sections 5.2.1 to 5.2.6.  
5.3 SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter  covered a comparative analysis and interpretation of empirical results on  the  
effect of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of financial information for listed 
companies in Sub-Saharan Africa with a focus on listed companies in  South Africa, Nigeria and 
East Africa. The chapter first discussed the random  effects multiple regression analysis of 
findings obtained using full models followed by the best models obtained through elimination of 
variables that are not significant. The findings show that for both listed firms in South Africa and 
Nigeria, CEO non-duality has a positive significant influence on disclosure of financial 
information. This implies that companies with separate roles of chief executive officers and 
chairman board of directors disclose more financial information. 
 
For listed firms in South Africa, it was further established that board size, profitability and 
leverage have a positive significant influence on disclosure of financial information. This is 
because companies with a big board size normally have a variety of directors with specialised 
skills, experience and professional expertise who are able to effectively monitor company 
operations and encourage companies to disclose more information. In addition, profitable firms 
tend to disclose more financial information to signal good performance while leverage 
encourages lenders to increase activities that enhance monitoring of company operations to 
safeguard the funds invested in the company. 
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 The findings also revealed that for listed firms in South Africa, block and director ownership of 
shares have a negative significant effect on disclosure of financial information. However, it was 
further revealed that for listed firms in Nigeria, the influence of block ownership of shares on 
financial disclosure is positive and significant.  Empirical findings in this chapter also established 
that for listed firms in Nigeria and East Africa, firm size has a positive significant effect on the 
disclosure of financial information. 
The next chapter presents a comparative analysis and interpretation of empirical results on the 
effect of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of non-financial information for listed 










ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS ON EFFECT OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ON DISCLOSURE OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents empirical tests and results of the study obtained using random effects 
multiple regression analysis of the effectiveness of corporate governance attributes on disclosure 
of non-financial information by listed companies. A comparative analysis was carried out for 
selected stock markets in Sub- Saharan Africa, covering listed companies in South Africa, 
Nigeria and East Africa. The chapter presents findings of  research question iii given in section 
1.3 of chapter one about examining the effect of corporate governance attributes on disclosure of 
non-financial information in developing economies. In this chapter, the analysis starts with full 
regression models predicting the impact of all corporate governance attributes and control 
variables on disclosure of non-financial information, followed by the best regression models 
obtained through step wise regression analysis where the best explanatory variables were 
carefully selected.  
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6.2 EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ATTRIBUTES ON DISCLOSURE 
OF NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
The results are presented in tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 
Table 6.1: Full model of Multiple Regression analysis (One-tailed test) for disclosure of non-financial 
Information from listed firms in South Africa 
 




Table 6. 2: Full model of multiple regression analysis (one-tailed test) for disclosure of non-financial 
information from listed firms in Nigeria 
 







Table 6. 3: Full model of Multiple Regression analysis (One-tailed test)  for disclosure of non-financial 
information using data from East Africa 
 





For listed firms in South Africa, the regression model in Table 6.1 shows that the  mean value of 
disclosure of non-financial information  increased by 2.93% and 2.91% in 2011 and 2012 
respectively, from the mean value of 2010. The period 2010 is used as a base year and therefore 
does not appear in the information given in the model. In 2013, the mean disclosure of non-
financial  information  decreased by 2.5% from that of 2010. Throughout the period of study, the 
change in disclosure levels  of non-financial information was statistically significant with p 
values of 0.001, 0.01 and 0.0055 for the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The regression 
model  is significant LR test (d.f.=13) = 67.40 and p value =0.0000 implying that there is 
sufficient data to evaluate the effect of the variables included in the model on disclosure of non-
financial information.  
 
For listed firms in Nigeria, the  regression model  shown in table 6.2 is not statistically 
significant (p value = 0.1937) and the changes in the mean values of  disclosure of non-financial 
information  over the study period are not statistically significant as shown by the  p values; 
0.2945 for 2011, 0.46 for 2012 and 0.384 for 2013. The implication of the model is that there is 
no sufficient evidence to predict the linearity relationship between the explanatory variables 
(CEO non-duality, board composition, composition of audit committee, block ownership, 
director ownership, firm size, leverage and profitability) and the dependent variable (disclosure 




 For listed firms in East Africa, the regression model given in table 6.3 is moderately statistically 
significant at 10% level (p value = 0.1005) and therefore provides evidence to evaluate variables 
included in the model. The changes in the mean values of disclosure of non-financial information 
over the study period are not statistically significant as shown by the p values: 0.3205 for 2011, 
0.4445 for 2012 and 0.0805 for 2013. A comparative analysis and interpretation of statistically 
significant findings of full regression models in tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 is given from section 
6.2.1 to 6.2.6 
6.2.1 Effect of CEO non-duality on disclosure of non-financial information. 
Empirical results in tables 6.1 and 6.3 show that for listed firms in Souh Africa and East Africa, 
CEO non-duality has a moderate positive statistical significant effect on disclosure of non-
financial information. The Beta coefficents and p values are  (β = 0.0478, p value = 0.0715) for 
listed firms in South Africa and (β = 0.1178, p value = 0.063) for listed firms in East Africa . The 
implication of this is that companies which separate roles of the chief executive officer from 
those held by the chairman board of directors, disclose more non-financial information. 
 
 For listed firms in Nigeria, the results in table 6.2 show that CEO non-duality  has a negative 
statistical significant influence on disclosure of non-financial information (β = -0.0893,  p value 
= 0.0335). The findings from listed firms in Nigeria imply that separating the roles of chief 
executive officer from those of chairperson board of directors, results in a decrease in the level of  
disclosure of non-financial information by 8.93%.  
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Empirical results from listed firms in Nigeria are consistent with findings by Khaled et al. 
(2012:9) on companies listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange, but are  inconsistent with 
Allegrini and Greco (2013:206), who established that combining  the roles of the two officers 
would instead result in a negative statistical significant influence on disclosure of corporate 
information. In addition, an empirical study by Jing et al. (2011:152) established that combining 
the roles of CEO and board chairman has no significant influence on corporate disclosure. 
6.2.2 Effect of board composition on disclosure of non-financial information 
Results from table 6.1 show that for listed firms in South Africa,  the effect of both board 
composition and  independent board composition on disclosure of non-financial  information,  is 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level (p values = 0.0325 and 0.021 for board 
composition and independent board composition respectively). The coefficient of board 
composition is 0.09272 which implies that on average, a unit increase in the proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of board of directors results in a 9.27% increase in disclosure 
of non-financial information. Similary, the coefficient of independent board composition is 
0.0729, implying that on average, a unit increase in the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, leads to a 7.29% increase in the level of disclosure of non-financial 
information. For listed firms in East Africa, the results in table 6.3 also show that the effect of 
board composition is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.22532, P value = 0.0415) while 
for listed firms in Nigeria, the study revealed that the effect of board composition on disclosure 




The findings from South Africa and East Africa support hypothesis 3.3.3b and are consistent 
with studies by Akhtaruddin et al  (2009:13); Allegrini (2013:192) and Htay et al. (2012:202) 
who established  that a higher percentage of independent non-executive directors on the board 
results in a statistically significant increase in disclosure of corporate information. The results are 
also supported by emprical evidence (Rouf, 2011:7844)  that a higher  proportion of independent 
non-executive directors results in a positive significant increase in disclosure of CSR 
information. Furthermore, consistent with the findings, Stefanescu (2013:129) argues that having 
a higher prorportion of non-executive directors on the board would result in better monitoring of 
company activities, increase transparency and disclosure of corporate information and  limit 
managerial opportunism. From the findings, it is clear that for a board of directors to be effective 
and enhance the disclosure of corporate information, the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board should be higher. 
6.2.3 Effect of block ownership on disclosure of non-financial information. 
Findings in table 6.1 show that for listed firms in Souh Africa, block ownership of shares 
significantly influences the level of  disclosure of non-financial  information (β = -0.0695, p 
value = 0.0025). The results  imply that an increase in block ownership of shares by 1% results in 
a  6.95% decrease in the level of disclosure of non-financial  information. For listed firms in 
Nigeria and East Africa, the results in tables 6.2 and 6.3 show that the influence of block 
ownership of shares on disclosure of non-financial information is not significant. The implication 
of the findings is that companies with a substantial number of shares held by few shareholders, 




The  results are consistent with empirical findings by Samaha et al. (2012:176) who carried out a 
study on the extent of corporate governance disclosures for Egyptian listed companies. They are 
further supported by Khan et al. (2012:211) who argue that in block or concentrated share 
ownership, public accountability is limited because of there being few outside shareholders, 
while companies with spread share ownership are expected to have more pressure to disclose 
more information due to visibility and accountability issues resulting from a large number of 
stakeholders. The  findings are however inconsistent  with emprical results by Roshima et al 
(2009:222) who established that block ownership of shares has a positive significant effect on 
disclosure of CSR information. Also Chakib (2012:60) carried out a study  from a sample of 52 
listed Tunisian firms and established that the owneship structure of a  firm does not affect its 
disclosure of corporate information. 
6.2.4 Effect of director ownership on disclosure of non-financial information 
Empirical results given in tables 6.1 and 6.2 show that for listed firms in South Africa and 
Nigeria,  director share ownership influences significantly the level of disclosure of non-financial 
information at 1% level  and 10% level respectively. The Beta coefficients and p values are  (β = 
-0.0892, p value = 0.0025 for listed firms in South Africa) and (β = 0.21055, p value = 0.1 for 
listed firms in Nigeria). The results imply that for listed firms in East Africa, a unit percentage 
increase in director  share ownership reduces disclosure of non-financial information by 8.92%. 
For listed firms in Nigeria, the implication of the findings is that for a unit increase in director 




The study findings  for listed firms in South Africa are consistent with emprical results by Rouf 
(2011:7832) and Nazli (2007:259) which revealed that companies in which executive and non-
executive directors held a higher proportion of shares  disclose significantly less CSR 
information in their annual reports. However, the findings are inconistent with results  by 
Donnelly and Mulachy (2008:423) on  a study of 51 companies listed on the Irish stock market   
that revealed that  managerial/director ownership has no effect on corporate disclosure. 
 
 Findings obtained from listed firms in Nigeria are conistent with results of the study by  Haiyan 
and Ahsan (2009:298) who carried out a panel data regression analysis on a sample of New 
Zealand listed companies and established that high levels of  managerial (executive directors) 
controlled ownership stucture have a positive effect on voluntary corporate disclosure. The 
argument for this is that in the operations of  financial markets,  the increase in share prices  as a 
result of greater corporate disclosure, benefits controlling managerial shareholders. This is 
because increased share prices result in company growth, which enhances directors’ reputations. 
6.2.5 Effect of board size on disclosure of non-financial information. 
Empirical results in table 6.2 show that for listed firms in Nigeria, the size of board of directors 
has a positive significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information at 5% level. The p 
value is 0.013 and the coefficient  β = 0.0163, which implies that increase in size of the board of 
directors by one member, results in an average  increase in the level of disclosure of non-
financial information by 1.63%.  For listed firms in South Africa and East Africa, results in 




 The   statistically significant findings established for listed firms in Nigeria  are consistent with 
empirical results by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:13) and Htay at al. (2012:201) who established that 
board size has a positive statistically significant effect  on corporate disclosure. In addition, 
research findings by  Roshima  et al. (2009:222) revealed that increase in board size  results  into 
a positive and statistical significant increase in disclosure of CSR information at 5% level. 
6.2.6 Effect of control variables on disclosure of non-financial information. 
Findings in table 6.1 show that for listed firms in South Africa,  leverage and profitability have a 
positive moderate significant influence on disclosure of non-financial information at 10% level 
(β = 0.0395, p value = 0.093 for leverage; β = 0.0674, p value = 0.0645 for profitability). The 
results are consistent with findings by Ntim et al. (2012:136) which revealed that both leverage 
and profitability have  a positive significant influence on disclosure of governance information. 
The implication of this is that for companies that are highly geared, lenders institute monitoring 
mechanisms to ensure that corporate managers disclose both operational and governance 
information. Similarly, highly profitable firms tend to disclose more information as an indication 
of good performance.  
 
 For listed firms in East Africa, only firm size has a positive significant influence on disclosure 
of non-financial information (coefficient β = 0.02234, p value 0.012). The study further 
established that for listed firms in Nigeria, the effect of all control variables (firm size, 
profitability and leverage) on disclosure of non-financial information is not significant.The 
findings from East Africa indicate that a unit percentage increase in company size results into a 
2.23% increase in the level of disclosure of non-financial  information. The implication of these 
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findings is that large companies strengthen their governance, monitoring and operation systems 
and strive to ensure that  information is disclosed to all stakeholders. 
 
 The results are consistent with emprical evidence by Broberg et al. (2010:370) and Akhtaruddin 
and Haron (2010:77) who established that the size of a company has a positive statistical 
significant influence on corporate disclosure. Similarly, Comier et al. (2010:577) argue that large 
firms provide more disclosures about management governance and control systems. 
Furthermore, according to Parves and Abdullah (2011:178), large companies have more 
responsibilities to society and are likely to disclose more information about social and 
environmental activities in their annual reports. The findings are also consistent with Nandi and 
Ghosh (2012:49) who assert that  large firms disclose more information than small ones  so as to 
attract prospective investors in capital markets and enhance their confidence  about the company 
operations.  
 
After  regression analysis using full models, further analysis was carried out where best 
regression models were obtained using stepwise regression analysis. This was done by 
eliminating variables that were not significant so as  to remain with significant variables in the 
model. Results from this analysis are presented in tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. 
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Table 6. 4: Best model of Multiple Regression analysis (one-tailed test) of non-financial information from 
listed firms in South Africa 
 




Table 6. 5: Best model of Multiple Regression analysis (One-tailed test)  for data from listed firms in 
Nigeria on disclosure of non-financial information 
 










Table 6. 6: The best model of multiple regression analysis (One-tailed test) for disclosure of non-financial 
information using data from East Africa 
 
One-tailed test, where:  Non-financial is disclosure of non-financial information; other variables are defined in table 6.2 
 
The best regression models given in tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 are statistically significant with (p 
value= 0.0000)  for South Africa, (p value = 0.0305) for Nigeria and (p value = 0.0206) for East 
Africa. This means that there is sufficient evidence to establish the effect of the independent 
variables given in the models on disclosure of information on  governance and CSR. Most of the 
variables included in the models have been interpreted and analysed except for the effect of non-
duality on disclosure of information on governance and CSR for listed firms in South Africa and 
East Africa.  Findings shown in tables 6.4 and 6.6 revealed that the effect of CEO non-duality on 
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disclosure of non-financial information is positively and statistically significant with (β = 0.0626, 
p value = 0.055) for listed firms in South Africa and (β = 0.1396, p value = 0.065) for listed 
firms in East Africa.  
 
The implication of these values is that for companies where the duties of the chief executive 
officer are separate from those of the board chaiperson, disclosure of non-financial  information  
siginificantly increases by 6.26% for South Africa and by 13.96% for East Africa. The findings 
further suggest that with CEO non-duality, the board exerts a lot of  influence  in the monitoring 
of  managerial activities, which ultimately enhances transparency and disclosure of information 
to corporate stakeholders. Similarly, Akileng and Donnelly (2013:8) argue that firms which 
separate  CEO and the chairman board of directors  roles are associated with more effective 
corporate governance monitoring, which improves disclosure of corporate information. 
  
The results are consistent with findings by Seamer (2014:121) which established that companies 
that segregated roles of CEO and board chair are less likely to fail their corporate disclosure 
responsibilities when compared to firms with dual responsibilities of CEO and chairperson board 
of directors. The study findings are also supported by the recommendation of the King III 
Report, Principle 1.18  (2009:12) in South Africa,  which states that for companies to strengthen 
their governance systems, the board of directors should be led by an independent non-executive 
chairperson who should not be the chief executive officer.  
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6.3  SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTER 
This chapter  has covered the analysis and interpretation of emprical results on  the effect of 
corporate governance attributes on disclosure of  information  for listed companies in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. It first covered a comparative multiple regression analysis of findings for listed 
firms in South Africa, Nigeria and East Africa  using full models followed by analysis of the 
results from  the best models. The findings show that for both listed firms in South Africa and 
East Africa, board composition has a positive significant effect on disclosure of non-financial 
information. This implies that companies with a higher proportion of non-executive directors on 
the board will exert influence on company management to disclose all non-financial information. 
 
From this chapter, it is further indicated that  for listed firms in South Africa, both block and 
director ownership of shares have  a negative significant effect  on disclosure of non-financial 
information. This is because in companies where a higher proportion of shares is owned by 
directors and block shareholders, disclosure tends to be  limited. The main reason for this is that 
in such companies, there is no motivation to disclose information to the public because it can 
easily be accessed by majority shareholders. In this chapter, it is also revealed that CEO non-
duality has a positive significant influence on disclosure of information for listed firms in South 
Africa and East Africa but a negative significant influence for listed firms in Nigeria. The 
implication is that companies with separate roles of chief executive officer and chairman board 




 The analysis in this chapter also shows that for listed firms in Nigeria, board size has a positive 
significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information. This implies that companies with a 
big board size  have a variety of directors with specialised skills, experience and professional 
expertise who are able to effectively monitor company operations and encourage companies to 
disclose more information. The chapter also includes the analysis which shows that control 
variables such as leverage and profitability have a positive significant effect on disclosure of 
non-financial information for listed firms in South Africa,  while firm size has a positive 
significant effect on disclosure of non-financial information in East Africa. 
 
The next chapter covers a summary and discussion of the empirical findings about the effect of 
corporate governance attributes on disclosure of both financial and non-financial information. It 
also covers conclusions, contribution,  and recommendations made from the study findings, 













 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS  
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter presents a discussion and implications of significant findings described in 
chapters 5 and 6 about a comparative regression analysis of the effect of corporate governance 
on disclosure of both financial and non-financial information. It also presents a summary of the 
study, describing the objectives and motivation of the study, and conclusions made based on 
empirical results. The chapter ends by highlighting the contributions and recommendations made 
to both the academia and policy regulators, limitations of the study and suggested areas for 
further research. 
7.2  DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  OF THE SIGNIFICANT  FINDINGS 
The summary of major findings showing the extent to which the null hypotheses are rejected is 











Table 7. 1: Summary of the results 
 
The discussion and implications of the significant research findings summarized in table 7.1 on 
how different corporate governance attributes affect disclosure of both financial and non-
financial information are presented from section 7.2.1 to 7.2.6. 
7.2.1  CEO non-duality 
Empirical results from table 7.1 show that separating the roles of CEO from those of board 
chairperson (CEO non-duality) has a positive significant effect on disclosure of financial 
information for listed companies in South Africa and Nigeria. It also has a positive significant 
effect on disclosure of non-financial information for listed companies in South Africa and East 
Africa. The implication of this is that separating roles of the board chairperson from those of the 
CEO will enable the former to exercise control over the activities performed by the latter.  This 
enhances effective monitoring of company operations and results in increased disclosure of all 
information to all corporate stakeholders. Empirical evidence shows that good governance 
prescriptions regarding board vigilance and enhanced corporate disclosures include constraint on 
CEO authority created by separating CEO and board chair roles (Essen et al., 2013:204).   
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The results are consistent with empirical evidence by Seamer, (2014:229), which indicates that 
disclosure of corporate information is increased if the roles of CEO and board chair are separate. 
They are also supported by Izyani and Zunaidah (2010:218) who argue that in good corporate 
governance systems, an independent board chairman would lead to a more transparent board and 
hence greater disclosure of financial information. Furthermore, according to Htay et al. 
(2012:199), board independence attained by separating the roles of CEO and board chairperson, 
is necessary to put pressure on management in disclosing more material information about the 
company, which is in line with the interest of shareholders.  However, for companies listed on 
the Nigeria Stock Exchange, the study established that separation of roles of the CEO and board 
chairperson has a negative influence on the disclosure of non-financial information. 
7.2.2  Board size 
Regarding the size of board of directors, summarized empirical results in table 7.1 show that 
board size has a positive significant effect on disclosure of financial information for listed firms 
in South Africa. It is also shown that for disclosure of non-financial information, board size has a 
positive significant effect for listed firms in Nigeria. Therefore, for disclosure of financial 
information in South Africa and non-financial information in Nigeria, the implication of findings 
is that increase in board size provides the company with a wide range of professionals with 
skills, competence and expertise necessary for improving the quality of financial reporting and 
disclosure. The results are consistent with empirical evidence (Mohamed et al., 2014:61) from 
Sri Lankan listed companies which shows that board size has a positive significant influence on 
sustainable reporting and disclosure of corporate information.  This is also supported by 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009:5) who argue that with more directors, the collective experience and 
expertise of the board increases and therefore the need for financial information disclosure is 
146 
 
higher. The findings are further supported by Jizi et al. (2014:610) who assert that large 
corporate boards are better and able to direct management to engage in and disclose CSR 
activities.  
7.2.3  Board composition 
The summary of empirical results in table 7.1 shows that board composition (having a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on corporate boards) has a positive significant effect on 
disclosure of non-financial information for listed firms in South Africa and East Africa. The 
implication of this is that having corporate boards with majority of non-executive directors 
improves the company’s decision-making process and corporate disclosure especially disclosure 
of non-financial information such as information on governance and CSR. 
 
The results are supported by Samaha et al. (2012:156) and are consistent with Khan et al. 
(2012:212)  and  Wan and Zunaidah (2010:217) who argue that the presence of independent non-
executive directors help in strengthening the board by monitoring the activities of management 
and ensuring that all corporate information is disclosed to stakeholders. It is also argued that the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board is pivotal because they are crucial in 
influencing corporate disclosure decisions and contribute their experience and expertise to the 
company to protect shareholders’ interests (Barros et al., 2013:564). This further implies that 
corporate boards with a higher proportion of non-executive directors tend to be independent in 
their operations and will exert pressure on management to be transparent and disclose all relevant 
information needed by stakeholders. However, for listed companies in Nigeria, findings revealed 
that board composition has a negative significant effect on disclosure of financial information. 
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The directional hypothesis that board composition has a positive significant influence on 
financial information is rejected. The results are supported by Azlan, Shian and Susela 
(2014:230) who state that the influence of independent non- executive directors in corporate 
reporting is restricted because they are not involved in the daily operations of the company. 
 
7.2.4  Block ownership of shares 
Summarized findings in table 7.1 show that: for listed companies in South Africa, block 
ownership of shares has a negative significant effect on disclosure of both financial and non-
financial information. The results imply that shareholders in companies with a high proportion of 
shares held by a few individuals (block shareholders), can easily access all relevant information. 
This view is supported by Ali-Najjar and Abed (2014:583) who assert that firms with 
concentrated ownership have less agency costs arising from shareholder/managers conflicts and 
hence, have less incentive to disclose information.  Therefore, in such companies, there is no 
need of demanding for high levels of corporate disclosure unlike in companies where the 
shareholding is spread to many shareholders. The empirical results are consistent with findings 
by Emma and Juan (2010:620) who established that concentrated ownership of shares has a 
negative significant effect on corporate disclosure of information on CSR activities.   
 
On the other hand, the study further established that block ownership of shares has a positive 
significant impact on corporate disclosure for listed firms in Nigeria. The implication of this is 
that companies with a higher proportion of shares held by shareholders with at least 5% of the 
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company’s total shareholding disclose more financial information. This is supported by empirical 
evidence by Huafang and Jianguo (2007:614) and Roshima et al. (2009:223). The possible 
argument for this is that substantial shareholders normally have a lot of interest in the 
investments made by company managers and will therefore exert a lot of influence on corporate 
managers to disclose more financial information.  
7.2.6  Director ownership of shares 
The study established that for listed firms in South Africa, the impact of director ownership of 
shares on disclosure of both financial and non-financial information is negative and significant. 
The implication of these findings is that companies where directors hold a higher proportion of 
shares disclose less information. The reason for this is that the information can easily be accessed 
by directors who at the same time are the ones mandated to disclose it. In addition, directors may 
have self beneficial interests in the operations of the company and therefore, they feel no strong 
motivation for them to increase disclosure of information to other stakeholders.  
 
The results are consistent with empirical evidence by (Nazli, 2007:260) which shows that 
director ownership of shares has a negative effect on disclosure of information on CSR for listed 
firms in Malaysia. The findings are further supported by Htay et al. (2012:5) who assert that 
directors with a substantial amount of share ownership might not want to disclose corporate 
information to outsiders because they can use their discretionary powers to spend company 
resources in ways that serve their own interests at the expense of shareholders. 
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7.3  SUMMARY OF STUDY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The primary objective of this study was to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and disclosure of corporate information by listed companies in developing 
economies. To address this primary objective, three specific objectives were identified: 
i. To identify and examine corporate governance attributes applicable for disclosure of 
corporate information by listed companies in developing economies. 
ii. To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of 
financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
iii. To examine the relationship between corporate governance attributes and disclosure of 
non-financial information by listed companies in developing economies. 
 
The motivation for this study was the need to obtain more empirical evidence about corporate 
governance attributes that affect disclosure of corporate information and also to contribute to 
already existing studies in developing economies. This is because prior studies indicate that little 
research about corporate governance and information disclosure has been carried out in 
developing economies (Nurwati and Wan, 2009:6) and yet, disclosure of corporate information is 
an important channel through which existing and potential shareholders obtain valuable 
information regarding the operations of the company. Furthermore, the contents of corporate 
disclosure reveal not only the company’s financial and operational situation but also its 
managers’ incentives and discretions to disclose information relevant for making decisions about 
investment alternatives (Omran and Abdelrazik, 2013:95). The study is based on the agency 
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theory which suggests a need for corporate disclosure as a way of reducing agency conflicts and 
information asymmetries that arise between shareholders and corporate managers. 
 
A comprehensive review of existing literature was conducted to identify potential corporate 
governance attributes that influence disclosure of corporate information in developing 
economies. Based on this review, six corporate governance attributes (CEO non-duality, board 
size, and board composition, composition of audit committees, block ownership of shares and 
director share ownership) and three control variables (leverage, profitability and firm size) were 
identified and discussed. Both null and directional hypotheses were then formulated showing the 
effect of independent variables (corporate governance attributes) on dependent variables 
(disclosure of financial and non-financial information). 
 
A positivistic research paradigm was adopted using the quantitative approach where panel data 
on the study variables was obtained from annual reports of a sample of listed firms in the study 
area (South Africa, Nigeria and East Africa) using McGregor and Bloomberg databases in the 
main Library at University of Cape Town (South Africa). Data analysis was carried out to test 
the hypotheses where Random Effects Regression Models were obtained using STATA MP 





On disclosure of financial information, study findings from listed firms in South Africa revealed 
that CEO non-duality, board size, profitability and leverage have a positive significant effect on 
corporate disclosure while the effect of block and director share ownership is negative. For listed 
firms in Nigeria, results show that CEO non-duality, block share ownership and firm size have a 
positive significant effect on disclosure of financial information, while for listed firms in East 
Africa, empirical evidence shows that only firm size has a positive significant effect on 
disclosure of financial information.   
 
Empirical results show that for listed companies in South Africa, CEO non-duality and board 
composition have a positive significant effect on disclosure of financial information. However, 
the findings further revealed that director and block share ownership have a negative significant 
effect on disclosure of non-financial information. For listed companies in Nigeria, it was 
established that board size has a positive significant effect on disclosure while the influence of 
CEO non-duality was negative. Findings further revealed that for listed firms in East Africa, firm 
size, board composition and CEO non-duality have a positive significant influence on disclosure 
of governance and CSR information.  
Based on these study findings, the following conclusions are made: 
 CEO non-duality (Separating roles of CEO and chairperson board of directors) has a 
positive significant effect on disclosure of corporate information. This is clear in the 
findings of South Africa (for disclosure of both financial and non-financial information), 
Nigeria (for disclosure of financial information) and East Africa (for disclosure of non-
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financial information). Hence, the chairperson of board of directors who does not hold 
executive functions, is expected to independently monitor company’s operations and 
exert influence to ensure that company management discloses all the relevant information 
to shareholders and other interested stakeholders. 
 Board size is positive and significantly associated with disclosure of financial 
information for listed firms in South Africa. It also has a positive effect on disclosure of 
non-financial information for listed firms in Nigeria. For East Africa, board size has a 
positive and significant effect on disclosure of both financial and non-financial 
information. Hence, for disclosure of financial information in South Africa and non- 
financial information in Nigeria, it is concluded that increase in the size of board of 
directors brings people with diverse professional expertise to corporate boards that are 
likely to act independently and objectively in corporate decision making. These directors 
are able to influence the company to disclose all the relevant information. 
 For listed firms in South Africa and East Africa, it is concluded that; companies with a 
higher proportion of non-executive directors on the board are more effective in disclosing 
non-financial information such as information on corporate strategy, governance, and 
CSR to corporate stakeholders. This is because non-executive directors act as 
independent representatives of shareholders interests in the company and will exert 
influence to management to disclose information. However, for disclosure of financial 
information, it is concluded that board composition has a negative significant influence 
on disclosure for listed companies Nigeria. For companies listed in South Africa and East 
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Africa, Board composition has no significant effect on disclosure of financial 
information. 
 Based on findings from listed companies in South Africa, companies where directors and 
block shareholders own a substantial number of shares, disclose less information to 
corporate stakeholders. This is because in such companies, there is no strong motivation 
for management to disclose information to corporate stakeholders because it can easily be 
availed to directors and any other substantial shareholders who are expected to have 
beneficial and controlling interests. For listed firms in East Africa, it is concluded that 
director ownership of shares has no significant impact on disclosure of both financial and 
financial information. This is possibly because, the proportion of shares held by directors 
is very small and therefore such little shareholding could not cause any significant impact 
on corporate disclosure. For instance the mean and median values of the proportion of 
shares held by directors in listed firms in East Africa are 0.050 and 0.0003 respectively. 
 Profitable companies are likely to disclose more information so as to attract potential 
shareholders to invest in the company. 
 Monitoring mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that managers of highly geared 
companies disclose more information to enable creditors evaluate the firm’s ability to 
meet their financial obligations. 
 Large companies normally have better internal management information systems as a 
result of different activities that they carry out and therefore, tend to disclose more 
information related to financial and non-financial activities than the small ones. 
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7.4  CONTRIBUTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The findings of the study make useful contributions to the debate on literature of corporate 
governance, agency theory and disclosure of corporate information which is important for 
enhancing corporate investments and economic growth. The study also has implications and 
policy recommendations for the users of corporate information especially investors, corporate 
governance regulators, regulators of capital market operations and researchers. 
 
Literature on the effectiveness of corporate governance systems in developing economies, 
especially in Africa, has been fairly underdeveloped. This study has therefore filled current 
research gaps on the effect of corporate governance on corporate disclosure by contributing to 
the body of knowledge in Accounting and Finance research in developing economies with 
particular emphasis on Sub Saharan-Africa. 
 
The study also makes a contribution by establishing some corporate governance attributes that 
are significantly associated with corporate disclosure in developing economies. It is the first of 
its kind for making a comparative analysis of companies listed on selected securities exchanges 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study is important in guiding the process of developing a model of 
corporate governance attributes that is vital for disclosing corporate information to various 
stakeholders. Disclosure of corporate information is important because it guides investors to 
make informed investment decisions which improves company performance and ultimately 
enhances economic growth. 
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The study makes useful recommendations to firms, regulators and academicians. To the firms, 
the findings of the study have helped in establishing some corporate governance attributes that 
help in strengthening the governance systems of corporations in developing economies, hence 
leading to corporate disclosure. For instance, with the exception of composition of audit 
committees, the study established that all other corporate governance attributes have a significant 
influence on the way companies disclose both financial and non-financial information.  
To regulators of capital markets in developing economies, the study findings have established the 
need for establishing strong corporate governance codes that guide the process of strengthening 
corporate governance systems and corporate disclosure requirements. For instance, although the 
King III Report in South Africa details the governance attributes necessary for strengthening the 
governance, financial reporting and disclosure practices for listed companies, there is no 
evidence to show the existence of strong corporate governance codes for listed companies in East 
Africa and Nigeria.  
 
To academicians, the findings of the study have implications on future research and teaching of 
Accounting and Finance especially in the area of corporate governance and disclosure of 
corporate information. The study contributes to market-based accounting research and the 




7.5  LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In this study, all the objectives stated in chapter one were achieved. The study has also made a 
significant contribution to the body of knowledge especially in examining the relationship 
between specific corporate governance attributes and corporate disclosure in developing 
economies. However, a few limitations are highlighted and should be considered while making 
interpretations and conclusions relating to the findings of the study. 
 
The study focused on six attributes of corporate governance that were identified through 
extensive literature review and therefore, it did not consider other aspects that could influence 
corporate disclosure. These include the effect of institutional and foreign investors, and the role 
played by board committees other than the audit committee. However data on these variables 
could not be readily available and a decision to exclude them in this study had to be made.  
 
Furthermore, although the King III Report on governance of listed companies in South Africa 
highlights corporate governance attributes that enhance corporate performance and disclosure, 
there is no clear developed corporate governance code for listed firms in East Africa and Nigeria 
to help in carrying out a comparative analysis. This makes it difficult to point out specific 
corporate governance attributes required for corporate disclosure in East Africa and Nigeria. 
However, a comprehensive review of literature helped in identifying and examining corporate 




The nature of sample size was another limitation. Data for this study was collected from annual 
reports of listed companies in selected securities exchanges in Sub Saharan Africa. These include 
380 annual reports from 95 listed companies in South Africa, 104 annual reports from 26 listed 
companies in East Africa and 100 annual reports from 25 listed companies in Nigeria. Although 
data for listed firms in South Africa was readily available from McGregor BFA database at 
University of Cape Town, data for listed firms in East Africa and Nigeria was not readily 
available. For instance, most companies did not have all the annual reports of the whole four year 
period of study (2010 to 2013) and therefore, the study only covered companies which had all 
the required annual reports.  
 
In addition to the above limitations, one of the major concerns of researchers is whether the 
findings of the study can be generalized to the whole population. The restrictions set during the 
process of sample selection of any study have a possibility of affecting the legitimacy of the 
overall findings. However as explained in the methodology chapter, the sample was carefully 
selected to ensure that the results of the sample can be generalized for the whole population. The 
study covered listed companies on major securities exchanges in Sub Saharan Africa and results 
obtained are a representative of the population. 
 
 Another limitation is that the study did not cover all the categories of companies in developing 
economies. It only covered non-financial listed companies and therefore other companies like 
those which offer financial and insurance services. Parastatal bodies and Non-Governmental 
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Organizations were excluded, and yet they play an important role in contributing to the economic 
growth of developing economies. 
 
Despite the above limitations, this study has added value to empirical corporate governance 
research in developing economies. It has provided insights into specific corporate governance 
attributes that influence disclosure of corporate information in developing economies thus 
providing many opportunities for future investigation in governance and management of 
companies in developing economies. 
7.6  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The study used a quantitative approach and provides good empirical evidence about the efficacy 
of corporate governance on corporate disclosure in developing economies. However, future 
studies should consider integrating quantitative and qualitative techniques (methodological 
triangulation) in order to enhance credibility and validity of the findings. 
 
Although the study examined the effect of the major internal governance mechanisms on 
corporate disclosure, future studies should be expanded to examine the influence of other 
corporate governance mechanisms such as the role of internal and external audits, share 
ownership by institutional and foreign investors, role of board committees and external 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE INDEX FOR THE STUDY 
A. FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
i. Genera financial information 
 Amount  and source of revenue 
 Sources of raw materials for manufacturing firms 
 Dividend payout policy 
 Information on retained earnings 
 Operating profits/losses 
 Market capitalization 
ii. Financial review information  
 Liquidity ratios 
 Debt/equity ratio 
 Return on capital employed 
 Return on shareholders’ equity 
 Dividend per ordinary share for the period 
 Comparative financial position statement for 3 to 5 years or more 
 Comparative profit and loss statement for 3 to 5 years or more. 
 Share price information 
iii. Future financial forecast (projected) information  
 Market share forecast 
 Future cash flow forecast 
 Share price estimation 
 Sales forecast 
 Profit forecast 
 Capital expenditure and R and D expenditure forecast 
 
B. NON FINANCIAL INFORMATION (GOVERNANCE AND CSR) 
i. Corporate background and governance information.  
 Company’s mission/vision statement 
 Brief history of the company 
 Description of business /activities 
 Corporate structure 
 Stock exchanges on which shares are held. 
 Statement of principal products 
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 Principal markets 
 Name and address of bankers 
 Name and address of legal advisors 
 Identity of senior  management which include; chief executive, board secretary and 
finance director 
 Name and registered office of the company 
 Name and address of financial advisors 
ii. Corporate strategic information  
 A statement of corporate strategy and objectives 
 Actions taken to achieve corporate objectives and strategy 
 Statement of operating goals and strategy 
 Actions taken to achieve corporate goals 
 Management organization chart 
iii. Governance information 
 Name of principal shareholders 
 List of directors 
 Shares held by directors of the company 
 Educational qualifications of directors 
 Experience of executive directors 
 Experience of non-executive directors 
 Directors’ remuneration 
 Position held by executive directors 
 Other directorship held by the directors 
 Age of directors 
 Board committees 
 Name of the auditors 
 Audit report 
 Number of employees for 2 or more years 
 Amount spent on training 
 Nature of training 
 Categories of employees trained 
 Numbers of employees trained 
iv. Corporate social responsibility information  
 Information on safety measures 
 Environmental protection programmes 
 Information on community services 
 Charitable donations 
 Value added statement 
Summary of expected number of disclosed items from company annual reports 
   
Governance and CSR information    = 40 
 Financial        = 20 





LIST OF COMPANIES INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE 
            
  
Companies from       
South Africa       Companies from Nigeria 
1 Afgri 51 Wescoal Holdings 1 Dangote Sugar Refinery 
2 Astral  52 York Timbers 2 Presco Plc 
3 Avi  53 Allied Electronics  3 Conoil Plc 
4 Crookes Brothers  54 Afrimat Ltd 4 National Salt co of Nig. Plc 
5 Distell Group  55 Adcorp 5 PZ Cussons 
6 Metair Investments  56 Aveng Group 6 Transnation 
7 Oceana Group  57 Austro Group 7 UPDC Ltd 
8 SAB Miller  58 Argent Industries Ltd 8 Total Nigeria 
9 Tiger Brands  59 ARB Holdings 9 RT Briscoe (Nigeria) plc 
10 Advtech Group  60 Bell Equipment Ltd 10 Red Star Express 
11 Comair Ltd  61 Basil Read holdings 11 Thomas  Wyatt Nig. 
12 Clicks Group Ltd  62 Barloworld 12 Nigerian Breweries 
13 City Lodge Hotels  63 Calgro M3 Holdings 13 Nestle Nigeria 
14 Cash Build  64 Ellies Holdings Ltd 14 Lafarge Cement WAPCO 
15 Famous Brands 65 ELB Group 15 IHS Nigeria 
16 Don group Ltd 66 DAWN 16 Glaxosmithkline 
17 CMH Group 67 Esorfranki Ltd 17 Guinness Nigeria 
18 Lewis group Ltd 68 Eqstra Holdings Ltd 18 First Aluminum Nigeria 
19 Kagiso Media 69 Hudaco Holdings 19 Airline Services and Log Ltd 
20 Grindrod 70 
Howden Africa 
Holdings Ltd 20 Julius Berger Nigeria Plc 
21 Mr. Price Group Ltd 71 Group 5 Ltd 21 Crusader 
22 Mass Mart 72 Grindrod Ltd 22 Starcomm Ltd 
23 Nictus 73 Jasco Electronics 23 Nigeria Aviation Handling 
24 Naspers 74 Invicta Holdings Ltd 24 Honewell Floormills 
25 Shorprite Holdings 75 Imperial 25 University Press Plc 
26 
Rex Trueforrm Clothing 
Ltd 76 Iliad Africa Ltd     
27 
Phumelela Gaming & 
Leisure 77 Kelly Group Ltd   
Companies from             
East Africa 
28 Spur Corporation 78 Kay Dav Group 1 CENTUM 
29 Spar Group 79 Mix Telematics 2 Athi River Mining 
30 Foschini Ltd 80 Metrofile Holdings 3 Bamburi Cement 
31 Taste Holdings 81 Mazor Group 4 BAT Kenya 
32 Woolworths Holdings 82 Masonite Group Ltd 5 Car & General (Kenya) Ltd 
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33 Winhold Ltd 83 PPC CEMENT 6 East African Breweries Ltd 
34 Truworths International 84 Santova Logistics 7 East African Cables 
35 Assore 85 Reunert Ltd 8 Everyday EA Ltd 
36 Arcelormitta 86 Mustek 9 Kakuzi Ltd 
37 Aquarius Platinum 87 Pinnacle Technology 10 Kenya Electricity G C 
38 Anglogold Ashante 88 Secure Data Holdings 11 Kenol Kobil 
39 Exxaro 89 
Adapt IT Software 
Solutions 12 Kenya Airways 
40 DRD Gold Ltd 90 Converge Net 13 
The Kenya Power & 
Lighting Co. 
41 Delta EMD 91 
Afro Centric 
Investments Ltd 14 RE Vipingo Plantations Ltd 
42 Gold One International 92 Med Clinic Group 15 National Media Group 
43 Merafe 93 Net Care Limited 16 Safaricom 
44 Keaton Energy 94 Adcock Ingram 17 Scangroup 
45 Omnia Holdings 95 Aspen Holdings 18 Sameer  Africa 
46 Northam Platinum     19 TPS Eastern Africa Ltd 
47 Metmar     20 Total Kenya 
48 Rolfes Holdings     21 Olympia capital 
49 Petmin     22 Mumias Sugar 
50 Sentula Mining Ltd     23 Crown Berger Kenya Ltd 
        24 Sasin Ltd 
        25 East Africa Portland Cement 
















Frequency distribution of Disclosure Index for listed firms in South Africa 
Financial Information Non-Financial Information (Governance and CSR) 
Value  Frequency Value Frequency 
0.474 4 0.522 3 
0.50 7 0.565 6 
0.526 8 0.609 7 
0.55 14 0.652 17 
0.579 10 0.696 26 
0.60 19 0.739 51 
0.632 14 0.762 1 
0.650 29 0.783 66 
0.684 16 0.81 1 
0.70 31 0.826 87 
0.737 28 0.87 75 
0.75 42 0.913 31 
0.789 30 0.95 9 
0.80 41   
0.842 24   
0.85 30   
0.857 1   
0.894 1   
0.895 10   
0.90 19   
0.94 1   
0.95 1   
Total 380  380 
 
